1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources.

1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims made in the United Kingdom. It represents the current assessment by the Immigration & Nationality Directorate of the general socio-political and human rights situation in the country.

1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain.

1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.

1.5 The assessment will be placed on the Internet (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/cipu1.htm). An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following organisations:

Amnesty International UK

Immigration Advisory Service

Immigration Appellate Authority

Immigration Law Practitioners' Association

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants

JUSTICE

Medical Foundation for the care of Victims of Torture

Refugee Council

Refugee Legal Centre

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

2.1. The People's Republic of China (PRC) covers 9,571,300 sq km of eastern Asia, with Mongolia and Russia to the north; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan to the north-west; Afghanistan and Pakistan to the west; India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam to the south; and Korea in the north-east. It has a long coastline on the Pacific Ocean. There are 4 municipalities - Beijing (Peking) (the capital), Shanghai, Tianjin (Tientsin) and Chongqing - and 22 provinces, of which the largest (by population) are Henan (Honan), Sichuan (Szechwan), Shandong (Shantung), Jiansu (Kiangsu) and Guangdong (Kwangtung). There are 5 autonomous regions - Guangxi Zhuang (Kwangsi Chuang), Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), Xinjiang Uygur (Singkiang Uighur), Ningxia Hui (Ninghsia Hui) and Tibet (Xizang) - as well as, from 1 July 1997, the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong. The total population exceeds 1.2 billion. [1]

2.2. Most of the Chinese asylum seekers in the United Kingdom are from Fujian province. Some areas in Fujian and neighbouring coastal provinces have a long tradition of migration and may have over 10% of their population living abroad, substantial foreign exchange earnings, access to high seas transport and large numbers of returned migrants living in the community.[2a,11c]

2.3. The principal language is putonghua (Standard Chinese/Northern Chinese/Mandarin). Local dialects are spoken in the south and south-east. The Tibetans, Uygurs, Mongols and other groups have their own languages. Putonghua is taught in the schools throughout China, but local dialects are commonly spoken. For example, Fuzhou (capital of Fujian province) has its own dialect, quite different from the national language, and different again from the dialect in southern Fujian. Cantonese, and subdialects of Cantonese, is commonly spoken in Guangdong province. The transcription of Chinese ideographs into the Roman alphabet leads to significant variances in spelling, although China does have a standard system, pinyin, which is used both in China and internationally.[1,2a].

3.1. The People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949 after a protracted and bitter civil war between the communist forces led by Mao Zedong and the nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai-shek. PRC is now one of the few remaining communist one party states left after the end of the Cold War.[3a]

3.2. In 1959, after the catastrophic failure of his 'Great Leap Forward' economic policies, Chairman Mao relinquished the post of Head of State and was replaced by Liu Shaoqi. During the following three years, as many as 25 million (some say 40 million) people died as a result of famine, drought, floods, withdrawal of Soviet aid and the policies of the Great Leap Forward. Under Premier Zhou Enlai, who was acting in conjunction with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others, the economy gradually recovered. However, the pattern of rule in China, through extensive social control and political campaigns and purges emphasising class struggle rather than the application of law, was established.[1,3a]

3.3. Chairman Mao, who had retained his positions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. This mass movement to radicalise Chinese society created intense factional struggle within the CCP. Red Guards, who followed the fanatical 'cult of Mao' and were given an open hand to smash the "four olds" (old ideas, old customs, old culture, old habits), were responsible for widespread anarchy and violence against the civilian population. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (General Secretary of the CCP) were disgraced, and Mao had to turn to the army to restore order.[1,3a]

3.4. The years before Mao's death in 1976 were characterised by an increasingly intense struggle for succession within the CCP. Premier Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and was replaced by Hua Guofeng. Deng Xiaoping, having been rehabilitated only in 1975, was again dismissed from his posts in the Central Committee. Mao died in September that year. His widow, Jiang Qing, and three associates ('the gang of four') tried unsuccessfully to seize power. Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao as CCP Chairman, and Deng Xiaoping was restored to his posts the following year.[1]

3.5. Although the worst abuses of the Cultural Revolution had subsided by 1970 this phase of China's history only officially ended when final judgement on the Cultural Revolution took place at the sixth plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981, which saw the beginning of the era of economic reform under Deng Xiaoping.[3a]

3.6. In 1978-79 a campaign for democratic reform and human rights, involving posters and demonstrations, took off in Beijing. It became known as the Democracy Wall Movement. The Movement was initially encouraged by Deng Xiaoping as a means of putting pressure on his political opponents; when his aims were achieved he suppressed the Movement. In March 1979 Democracy Wall leading figure Wei Jingsheng was arrested and subsequently sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for "counter-revolutionary" crimes.[3a]

3.7. In September 1982 the CCP was reorganised and the post of Party Chairman abolished. The following year a purge of the Party was launched, aimed at removing the 'Maoists' who had risen to power during the Cultural Revolution, and those opposed to the pragmatic 'open door' policies of Deng. China's new Constitution restored the office of Head of State, and in June 1983 Li Xiannian became President of China. Later that year the Party launched a major operation to combat crime and a campaign against 'spiritual pollution', involving censorship to limit the effects of Western cultural influences.[1]

3.8. Reorganisation of the CCP and the government, and a programme of social reform aimed at modernising the economy and developing China's external relations, continued through the mid-1980s. There was also a significant liberalisation in the arts and sciences, with the revival of the Hundred Flowers movement of the mid-1950s which had encouraged the development of intellectual debate. However, increasing demands for democratic reform met stiff resistance from the hardline elderly elements in the leadership, who opposed Deng's social reforms, despite Deng's opposition to any political reform which threatened the power of the CCP. In December 1986 student protesters took to the streets in provinces throughout China, initially protesting corruption but soon also demanding increased democracy and better living conditions. Chinese leaders reacted with restrictive measures on rallies and protest marches, whatever the source of grievance, and the dismissal from their posts of a number of prominent intellectuals. Hu Yaobang was forced to resign as CCP General Secretary in January 1987, having been accused of failing to stem the tide of 'Western bourgeois liberalisation'. He was replaced by Zhao Ziyang.[1,3a]

3.9. Nevertheless, it became clear at the 13th National Congress of the CCP in late 1987 that the 'reformist' faction within the leadership had prevailed. Deng retired from the Central Committee, but retained influential positions within the Party. In 1988 Li Peng replaced Zhao Ziyang as Premier, and Yang Shangkun became President.[1]

3.10. In April 1989, Hu Yaobang died. In the following days, thousands of students maintained a vigil in his honour, calling for an end to perceived levels of official corruption and protesting current social conditions. Although initiated by students, the protest movement struck a chord with the general populace, including workers, government employees, workers and journalists. In May, demonstrations calling for modernization, democracy, free speech and the right to form trades unions filled the streets of Beijing.[4]

3.11. On 13 May, a group of up to 3,000 students began a hunger strike as a way of pressurising the Chinese leadership to open a dialogue to discuss the protesters' grievances. This in turn resulted in a huge demonstration of support for the hunger strikers; on 17 May an estimated one million Chinese gathered at Tiananmen and demonstrations spread to other major cities in China's provinces. Zhao Ziyang, who was considered to be relatively supportive of the call for reform, visited Tiananmen Square in an attempt to pursuade the hunger strikers to call off their protest, and commended their "patriotic spirit". The following day Li Peng met students, accused them of bringing anarchy and ordered them to leave, without success.[1,4,5]

3.12. Martial law was declared on 20 May, by a leadership fearful of national chaos and its own loss of power. The declaration only drew further demonstrations in protest against its imposition, although the numbers at Tiananmen began to decline. On 4 June, troops of the People's Liberation Army, in tanks and armoured personnel carriers, attacked protesters on and around Tiananmen Square. At least a thousand civilians reportedly were killed in the military crackdown in Beijing and most major cities, despite the government's denial that anyone was killed in Tiananmen Square itself.[1,4,5,6a]

3.13. The authorities reacted vigorously to the threat to the absolute power of the CCP represented by the 1989 demonstrations. Those identified as having "counter-revolutionary" tendencies were subject to a range of repressive tactics depending on their level of dissident activity. At least hundreds were arrested or detained, and there were a number of executions. Students, public servants, workers and military personnel were required to perform self-criticism; ideological education classes were reinstated, and social control was tightened.[1,5,6a]

3.14. Zhao Ziyang was dismissed from his posts, although he was not expelled from the CCP, and was placed under house arrest. To take his place as CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin was brought in from Shanghai, where he was credited with handling demonstrations better than had been the case in Beijing. Jiang Zemin a Martial law was lifted in January 1990, and some of the pro-democracy detainees were released. The following years demonstrated the leadership's commitment to a 'socialist market economy' and its continued emphasis on the need for national stability under an all-powerful CCP.[1]

3.15. Nevertheless, public disquiet over corruption within the CCP, state bureaucracy and economic enterprises (such as extorting money from businesses, embezzlement and taking bribes) remained and was acknowledged by the Party in 1993, when an anti-corruption campaign was launched. The campaign continued over the following years and was intensified in 1997, during which it was top of the political agenda with a series of national meetings and regulations. The CCP leadership has identified corruption as the single greatest threat to continued Party rule. Like the 'Strike Hard' campaign against crime, initiated in 1996, and other anti-crime operations, the anti-corruption campaign has resulted in thousands of executions.[1,7c,9a]

3.16. During 1998, the regime continued to place emphasis on tackling through investigation and punishment the occurrence of corruption and dereliction of duty, including that perpetrated by senior communist officials.[7k,21c]

3.17. Incidents of crime, including bomb blasts and explosions, increases significantly in 1997-1999. Official sources blamed the increase on joblessness, widening income disparities and anger at rampant corruption.[9x]

3.18. Jiang Zemin was re-elected to a second five-year term as President on 16 March 1998. Hu Jintao became Vice-President. On 17 March 1998, Premier Li Peng was replaced by Zhu Rongji, a former Vice-Premier in charge of economic policy. Li Peng replaced Qiao Shi as Head of Parliament.[7l]

3.19. Jiang Zemin's implementation of Deng Xiaoping's Theory of a socialist market economy is intended to restructure thousands of state owned non-viable enterprises through bankruptcy, merger and privatisation. Failing enterprises have used tactics to mask unemployment, such as reduced or minimal wages and forced early retirement.[10c,16a,21] Further millions of jobs are to be lost in the slimming-down of the state bureaucracy and the army[9o]; official statistics indicate 17% unemployment rate in 1999.[9t] Economic reforms are raising living standards for many, strengthening entrepreneurs, diminishing central control over the economy, and creating new economic opportunities.[9j] The 15th National Congress authorised the sale and 'downsizing' of China's 300,000 state firms. The consequent loss of jobs, and the iron rice bowl welfare commitments linked to state sector employment have led to demonstrations, which have not so far coalesced into nationwide protests.[16c]

3.20. Chinese leaders have launched a re-employment project and have promised that a basic pension, medical and unemployment insurance system will be in place by the end of the year.[2b,7i,11b] However, there is little progress on welfare reform on a national scale to date.[11d]

3.21. 1999 saw a number of significant anniversaries, in particular the 10^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident (4^th June) and 50 years of Communist rule (1 October). The authorities took a number of repressive measures to ensure that there was no social disruption. Known political dissidents were detained or placed under house arrest. Tiananmen Square was closed in June for refurbishment. Non-Beijingers were limited in their access to the city. Over 100,000 criminal fugitives were rounded between July and September.[9yy]

3.22. Nato forces bombed China's Embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999, killing three Chinese citizens. Nato described the attack as a tragic mistake. Chinese authorities and the public were out raged. A number of anti-US demonstrations were held in major Chinese cities, condoned and encouraged by the authorities during the following days, after which the authorities called for stability and the protests ceased.[9cc,9dd,9ee] The US paid $4.5 million in compensation.[9tt]

3.23. In July 1999, tensions between China and Taiwan increased, as a result of President (of Taiwan) Lee Teng-Hui's call for ties to be on a "special state-to-state" basis.[9pp] China retaliated with large-scale joint landing exercises in coastal parts of Zhejiang province and the southern part of Guangdon province, and other shows of military force.[9vv]

3.24. An army colonel and a retired general were executed in September 1999 for selling military secrets to Taiwan.[9xx]

3.25. Hong Kong reverted to China on 1 July 1997 under the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1994. The Joint Declaration provides for a high degree of autonomy in the Special Administrative Region and to be allowed to keep its capitalist system and lifestyle unchanged for 50 years.[1,9c]

3.26. Turnout to the elections to the 60-seat Legislative Council (Legco) in May 1998 was higher than had been anticipated. Only 20 seats were directly elected; 30 were indirectly elected by corporate voters in functional constituencies representing professional and business bodies, and 10 by an electoral committee dominated by Beijing-affiliates. The pro-democracy Democratic Party led by Martin Lee took 13 seats; the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong took 9. Other parties with seats were Liberal Party (9), HK Progressive Alliance (5), Frontier (3), Citizens Party (1) and independents (20).[20a]

3.27. During 1997-1998, Beijing respected its "one state, two systems" undertaking, although Hong Kong's Democracy Party was excluded from the Provisional Legislature.[9c,6i] Tighter restrictions were imposed on public gatherings, but the Hong Kong administration did not reject any applications for demonstrations or rallies. Tens of thousands attended a demonstration on the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, organised by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. Video messages were relayed to the demonstrators from Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan in USA. There were no arrests.[13d]

3.28. Freedom of speech and judicial independence were reported to have been maintained.[9i] (but see next paragraph). There were no reports of official interference in the activities of Hong Kong-based dissidents.[9d]

3.29. On 29 January 1999, a landmark Court of Final Appeal (CFA) ruling interpreted the Basic Law (HKSAR's constitution) to give a right of abode to children of Hong Kong residents. Previous controls excluded illegitimate children and those born before one parent had become resident in Hong Kong. [9w] Mainland legal experts, quoted widely in the official media, condemned the CFA for claiming jurisdiction over "constitutional" matters.[9q,20d] The judgement lead to widespread concern in HKSAR: an official survey estimated that around 1.6 million mainlanders would be eligible to settle in Hong Kong.[9bb] Following an approach by the Hong Kong government, the National Peoples Congress in Beijing overruled the CFA and issued a judgement interpreting the Basic Law. [9hh].

3.30. In January 1998, the Provisional Legislative Council announced the end of the Port of First Asylum policy for Vietnamese boat people. Vietnamese were to be treated in the same way as other illegal entrants and would be repatriated. The remaining 1,200 Vietnamese refugees were encouraged to become self-reliant in Hong Kong while awaiting resettlement.[17]

4.1. China is a unitary state. Political power is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The highest organ of state power is the National People's Congress (NPC), which meets in plenum once a year. The NPC is composed of deputies elected for a five year term by local people's congresses of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the People's Liberation Army. A Central Committee is elected at National Congress; to direct policy, the Central Committee elects a Politburo. Retired senior CCP leaders retain considerable power, but in mid-1995, the top leadership announced that ultimate authority had been passed to the younger generation of leaders in the (currently) 22-member Politburo. The Politburo's Standing Committee has 7 members.[1,2b]

4.2. China's constitution, PRC's fourth, was adopted by the NPC in December 1982 and amended in 1993. It defines the functions and powers of institutions of the State and Government, and restored the office of Head of State (President).[1]

4.3. Other political organisations such as the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the China Democratic League, and the China Democratic National Construction Association, act in support of socialism and the CCP. Attempts to establish political parties independent and critical of CCP's monopoly rule are curtailed by the authorities. However, several hundred million Chinese have participated in the village elections programme, which allows basic democratic expression in multicandidate elections for nongovernmental local village committees. Foreign observers have described these elections as, on the whole, fair. Successful village committee elections have included campaigning by multiple candidates, platforms, and the use of secret ballots.[1,2d,3f,7d]

4.4. The Supreme People's Court stands at the apex of the court system, followed in descending order by the higher, intermediate, and basic people's courts. Only courts can sentence prisoners to facilities managed by the criminal justice system. However, government authorities can assign persons accused of minor public order offences to reeducation-through-labour camps in an extra-judicial process (see paragraph 4.16).[2b]

4.5. The 1982 Constitution contains reference to most of the fundamental human rights as recognised by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, it also defines the duties of Chinese citizens as safeguarding the unity of the country, observing public order and respect for social ethics, and refraining from acts detrimental to the security, honour and interests of the motherland.[1]

4.6. The Criminal Law of the PRC was amended in March 1997. Article 13 defines as crimes "all acts that endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the state; split the state; subvert the political power of the people's democratic dictatorship and overthrow the socialist system; undermine social and economic order;... and other acts that endanger society." Article 13 also states that "if the circumstances are clearly minor and the harm is not great, [such acts] are not to be deemed crimes." [7a] (See also paragraph 5.4)

4.7. The Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), adopted in 1979, was revised in March 1996. The revisions came into force in January 1997. The revised CPL increased the protections for people detained under the criminal justice system, including guaranteed access to legal counsel after interrogation or detention by the police. The revised law also adjusts the balance of the "verdict first, trial second" provisions of the 1979 law, under which a verdict and sentence were usually decided by an adjudication committee and rubber-stamped by the trial court. It is now the trial court rather than the court president who can decide to refer difficult cases to the adjudication committee, and only where the trial court finds it difficult to reach a decision having heard and deliberated the evidence.[2b,6b] During 1998, the government increased its efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors and the public on the provisions of the new law, implementation of which remains uneven and far from complete.[2d]

4.8. Despite its revisions, the CPL permits long periods of detention without charge or trial, and grants wide powers to the police to restrict or detain people on their own authority, without judicial review. Although "arrest" requires review and approval by the procuracy, the CPL allows the police to impose four forms of restriction or detention without charge for which there is no review and approval procedure. These are "summons", "taking a guarantee and awaiting trial", "supervised residence", and "detention". Arrest marks the time at which a suspect is formally charged with a crime. Arrest is followed by a period of "investigation", usually by the police, which ends when the police file a request for prosecution with the procuracy. The procuracy then reviews the case in order to decide whether or not to initiate a "public prosecution". If it proceeds with prosecution, the procuracy writes an indictment and transmits the case to court for examination and trial. After reviewing the case the court decides whether or not to proceed with the trial. Throughout this process, detainees have right of access to a judge to challenge the grounds of their detention only when the length of detention has exceeded the time limits prescribed by law.[6b]

4.9. The revised CPL provides exemptions in "state secrets" cases; for example, the denial of access to lawyers while a case is being investigated. The definition of "state secrets" is broad and vague and subject to independent interpretation by police, prosecutors and judges, at different stages in a criminal case.[2d]

4.10. The State Compensation Law of 1995 provides a legal basis for citizens to recover damages for illegal detentions. Although the majority of citizens apparently are unaware of this law, there is evidence that it is having some limited impact.[2d]

4.11. New regulations were announced in January 1998 outlining the delineation of responsibility in conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions. The regulations are aimed at easing the implementation of the amended Criminal Procedural Law. The regulations consist of 14 parts, totalling 48 articles, covering areas such as access to lawyers, bail applications, and the conduct of arrests. Suspects and their relatives can hire lawyers once they are subject to police investigation and police must promptly relay requests for legal representation once they hold a suspect. The police cannot refuse a lawyer-client meeting in detention unless the case involves national security. A seven-day deadline on bail application rulings has been introduced.[15]

4.12. During 1998 the judiciary has promoted greater public scrutiny of its operations. Courts have opened public galleries and hotlines have been set up so the public can report misconduct and incompetence by judges and prosecutors. In July 1998, China Central Television transmitted the first live broadcast of a court case, at Beijing's First Intermediate People's Court.[9k,18] Cases involving state security, personnel privacy or minors are exempted from the legal requirement to be held in public.[2d] The Supreme People's Court issued rules in March 1999 enforcing public access to trials except in cases deemed "inappropriate".[9y]

4.13. The use of legal procedures to redress problems is on the increase, as is the use of private lawyers. Government figures indicate that there are now 8,300 lawyers' offices in China, with 114,000 lawyers. The Supreme People's Procurate reported that citizens filed 90,000 lawsuits against government officials in 1997.[9h,2d]

4.14. A Law on Administrative Appeals was adopted in April 1999, to take effect on 1 October 1999. Under the Law, citizens are entitled to appeal against government infringement of their rights and interests, and also against "illegal" government public documents.[9aa]

4.15. The conviction rate is over 90%. Coerced confessions frequently are introduced as evidence. There is an appeals process, but appeals generally do not reverse verdicts.[2d]

4.16. The emphasis given by the Chinese authorities on the need to maintain stability and social order has given rise to forms of administrative detention that have been widely used in China since the 1950s against many of those who may or may not have committed a crime. Government officials have been able to impose random and unreasonable penalties, lacking a legal basis, on those for whom there was little or no evidence to charge with a crime. To regulate the system of administrative sanctions which can be imposed by state officials, the Administrative Punishment Law was brought into force in October 1996.[6b]

4.17. Two forms of administrative detention which have given rise to human rights violations are "shelter and investigation" and "reeducation through labour". The revised CPL abolished shelter and investigation as an administrative measure, though this form of detention has now been integrated into the criminal process. The regulations on shelter and investigation allowed the police to detain specific categories of suspects without charge for periods up to three months. In practice, it has been used as a convenient measure to detain, without judicial review, anyone the police wished, including political dissidents, whether or not they met the specified categories and often for periods exceeding the permitted maximum.[6b]

4.18. Reeducation through Labour (not the same as Reform through Labour, which is a criminal sanction) is a form of administrative detention imposed as a punishment on those regarded as troublemakers or those accused of minor offences not amounting to "crimes". It involves detention without charge or trial for up to three years, renewable by one year, in a forced labour camp. People who can be subjected to this punishment include those classified as endangering state security, anti-Party, anti-socialist, anti-social elements and hooligans.[6b] (see also paragraph 5.5)

4.19. All land in China is owned by the State, represented in rural areas by collectives. The Land Administration Law, amended in 1988, states that "When the state requisitions land for construction, the units whose land is requisitioned should subordinate their wishes to the needs of the state and shall not obstruct the requisition." Decisions on what plots should be requisitioned are generally made at local (county) level. County level officials are also responsible for rates of compensation, and the administrative sanctions to be imposed on those who make unlawful land transfers, constructions and excavations. Disputes over land use and ownership are also resolved at or above county level.[14]

4.20. Provision is made for the payment of compensation and, where appropriate, resettlement subsidies when land is requisitioned. Article 27 of the Law states that "The compensation for requisition of cultivated land shall be 3 to 6 times the average annual output value of the requisitioned land for the 3 years preceding such requisition. Provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall stipulate standards of land with reference to the standard of compensation for requisition of cultivated land."[14]

5.1. Since 1997 there have been positive steps in human rights, although serious problems remain. There are no independent Chinese organisations in China that publicly monitor or comment on human rights conditions. The Constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights, but they are often ignored in practice. The authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public order and suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms, and the Constitution proscribes a duty on citizens to observe public order (see paragraph 4.5.). Reports of abuses include the torture and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and long periods of detention, often without the prisoners' families being told where they were held. According to well-known dissident Wang Dan, political prisoners are subjected to physical beatings from other inmates, with the collusion of the guards.[2d,12]

5.2. The Government responds to international criticism of its human rights record by invoking principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty. It argues that a nation's political, economic and social system and its historical, religious and cultural background determine its concept of human rights; and that economic security is the paramount human right. At a law enforcement conference in late 1997, President Jiang told the internal security forces that "Stability is the prerequisite for reform and development".[13b]

5.3. However China was more open to dialogue in 1998 than at any time in the recent past. In 1997 the UNESCO Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was allowed to visit China.[8] Many countries have started or resumed human rights dialogues with China, including UK. In September 1996 China and the European Union resumed their human rights forum. Chinese officials met with Amnesty International in July 1997.[2b,2d,7b,13b] President Clinton raised the issue of human rights during his high-profile visit to China in June 1998, and in September 1998 Mary Robinson was the first UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China.[20b] China signed the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in October 1997, and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998. However, it may be some considerable time before these treaties are ratified and incorporated into domestic law [9r], and arrests of dissidents towards the end of 1998 and into 1999 indicated that the authorities continued to be intolerant of dissent (see paragraph 5.11).

5.4. There have been accounts of extremely serious and widespread human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang. This assessment makes only brief reference to them, because asylum seekers from these regions are very rare in the United Kingdom.

5.5. Political dissent is tightly controlled. Public dissent, criticism and protest in China have been silenced by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison terms, administrative detention and house arrest. Government officials deny that China holds political prisoners, asserting that persons are detained not for the political or religious view they hold but because they have taken some action that violates the Criminal Law. Prior to revision, (see paragraph 4.7) Articles 90-104 of the Criminal Law provided for "counter-revolutionary crimes". These articles have been used to punish persons who organised demonstrations, disrupted traffic, disclosed information to foreigners, or formed unauthorised organisations. The revised version does not refer to counter-revolution, but continues to proscribe "acts that endanger national security". Article 105 of the revised Criminal Law, for example, provides for sentences of up to five years' imprisonment for "whoever instigates the subversion of the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system."[2b,2d,7a] The cases of people still serving sentences for "counter-revolutionary offences have not been reviewed.[6h]

5.6. Conditions for all inmates of penal institutions are generally harsh and frequently degrading. [2b] There are reports that some political prisoners have been unable to obtain adequate medical care; and reports of beatings by guards and fellow inmates, electric shocks and solitary confinement.[2d,3f] (see also paragraph 5.1 and 6.1)

5.7. Many of those arrested for participation in the pro-democracy movement in Beijing (but not in other locations) have been released. Security officials have stated that all cases from the period of the Tiananmen demonstrations have been concluded.[2a] However, Amnesty International maintains that well over 250 people remain imprisoned in connection with the 1989 protests.[6h] Those who have been released and continue to make political protest in China remain liable to further detention and harassment for subsequent "crimes", such as signing petitions or participating in Tiananmen Square massacre commemorative events around 4 June.[2a,6h]

5.8. There are several examples in which the Chinese government apparently timed the release or detention of well-known dissidents to coincide with events of international significance to the country.[12] The pro-democracy activist Wei Jingsheng was given medical parole and effective exile to USA in November 1997, following President Jiang's state visit to Washington. Bao Ge (now in the US), who went on a hunger strike in 1993 to demand the release of another dissident, was himself detained five times briefly in the next year during high-level visits from US, Japanese and French representatives.[3f,10b]

5.9. A number of dissident groups emerged in 1991, including the Liberal Democratic Party of China (LPDC, Zhongguo Ziyou Minzhu Dang, or Freedom and Democracy Party); the China Progressive Alliance (CPA, or Zhonghua Jinbu Tongmeng); the Free Labour Union of China (FLUC,or Zhongguo Ziyou Gonghui); and the Social Democratic Party of China (SDPC, or Zhongguo Shihui Minzhu Dang.) During 1992, the authorities put a stop to their activities by arresting scores of activists and suspected supporters.[6j]

5.10. In June 1998, Wang Youcai tried to register a China Democratic Party with Zhejiang provincial authorities, the first open attempt to gain government approval for an opposition party. It was reported that he was turned away, and detained for six hours by the police. Another member of the group, Zhu Yufu, was detained for 47 hours for handing out copies of the manifesto during President Clinton's visit (see paragraph 6.15). The activists announced that they had shelved the attempt to register the political party after one week, when Clinton's visit was coming to an end.[9f] Nevertheless, Wang Youcai and up to 4 others were subsequently arrested and detained.[18] A number of other dissidents were detained or had their movements restricted during Clinton's visit.[9q]

5.11. Subsequent attempts to set up the China Democratic Party have led to a number of arrests in Beijing and the provinces.[9s] In some places, activists were harassed or temporarily detained, while in others local officials met with dissidents and explained the requirements for registering social organisations. However, the applications would be approved.[2d] In December 1998 Xu Wenli, Qin Yongmin and Wang Youcai were sentenced to 13,12 and 11 years in prison respectively, on subversion charges.[22a] President Jiang has told officials to "pay particular attention to social order and stability" during 1999, when a number of sensitive anniversaries will occur (50 years since the founding of PRC, 40 years since a Tibetan uprising, 10 years after Tiananmen Square demonstration).[9u] In March 1999, Amnesty International reported that many scores of people had been detained, harassed and imprisoned solely for peacefully exercising the rights protected by the two UN Covenants on Human Rights that China had recently signed.[6j]

5.12. The families of notable dissidents, particularly those who become spokespeople, are often kept under heavy surveillance and may be subjected to frequent police questioning and visits.[3f,9b,6f]

5.13. Although the Constitution affirms tolerance of religious belief, the government seeks to restrict and control religious practice. Proselytizing is proscribed. All religious groups are required to register with government religious affairs bureaux and come under the supervision of official "patriotic" religious organisations. The police and religious officials have been responsible for shutting down unauthorised mosques, temples, seminaries and "house church" groups, and leaders of such groups have been subjected to detention for lengthy questioning. Since 1996 all registered groups are subject to annual inspection. The restrictions under which they operate vary by location.[23] However, the government generally tolerates the existence and activities of unsanctioned churches as long as the services are small and there is no higher-level organising. In some areas registered and unregistered churches are treated similarly by the authorities and congregants worship in both types of churches. In general, individual worshippers are not harassed by the regime, whose sporadic efforts principally target leaders for harassment, detention and physical abuse.[2a,2b,2d]

5.14. Since 1979 there has been a gradual relaxation of government policy towards religious activities, and churches, temples, mosques and lamaseries (Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries) closed or destroyed during previous decades were restored and reopened. According to the government, there are now more than 85,000 registered places of worship. Students at officially-administered religious institutes must demonstrate "political reliability". Religious belief is considered to be incompatible with CCP membership, and participation in religious activity is forbidden to members of the People's Liberation Army.[2b,2d,6d]

5.15. China has invited an increasing number of foreign religious organisations to visit religious sites and talk to official religious figures and leaders.[2d]

5.16. In the 1950s the government, to curb perceived foreign domination of Christian groups, established the Catholic Patriotic Association (independent of the Vatican) and the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement. In 1980 the (Catholic) National Bishop's Conference and the (Protestant) China Christian Council were established. These churches are the only ones authorised to operate openly. The government estimates that China has 4 million registered Catholics and 10-15 million registered Protestants. Unregistered Christians in China include Vatican-orientated Catholic and "house church" Protestants (some of the latter are registered but most are not).[2c,2d] Over 20 million bibles have been published in the last two decades, according to the Three-Self Patriotic Movement.[9v]

5.17. In August 1999, 30 Protestant House Church leaders were arrested at a private home in Henan Province. An official source said that most of those detained had been released after receiving "re-education."[9uu,23b]

5.18. The government makes a distinction between the five officially recognised religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Islam and Taoism) and those which it claims are heterodox and thus classified as 'cults' or 'sects'. In practice, little effort is made generally to distinguish between unregistered house churches and less conventional groups.[23] However, those that preach beliefs outside officially approved doctrine - such as the coming of the Apocalypse - are often singled out for harassment. Since the early 1980s, the authorities have detained, fined or imprisoned members of an underground evangelical sect called the Shouters (a branch of a pre-1949 indigenous protestant group).[2d]

5.19. Most recently, Wang Jincai, a leader of the Shouters, was detained in a raid in 1999, only five days after serving a three year sentence in a labour camp. [9ss] The founder of Zhu Shen Jiao (Supreme Spirit) sect was sentenced to death for fraud, rape and "sabotaging the law by organising Satanic religious activities" [9ii]; 71 members of MenTu Hui (Disciples Society) were rounded up in Chongquing [9jj]; and severe action was taken against Falun Gong.

5.20. In April 1999, more than 10,000 adherents of Falun Gong staged a demonstration outside Beijing's leadership compound. The gathering was by far the largest since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest, and took the authorities by surprise. It came a week after a large demonstration in Tianjin against a magazine that had denigrated the sect. The Tianjin demonstration had triggered five arrests, and the Beijing demonstration was to demand redress. The Beijing protesters, many of whom were into middle or old age, dispersed peacefully after being promised a meeting between the organisers and the State Council.[9z,9ww]

5.21. Beijing police prevented several thousand Falun Gong members from holding a mass protest three months later. Many practitioners were rounded up and taken to sports stadia in Beijing and around the country. On 22 July 1999, the authorities banned the Research Society of Falun Dafa and its organisation Falun Gong, classifying it as a 'cult' that threatened social chaos and cheated people. Millions of Falun Gong publications have been destroyed and the 'cult' has been widely condemned in official publications. [9qq]. The following activities were decreed illegal and liable to prosecution: distributing or promoting Falun Gong materials or gathering to carry out meditation exercises to promote or protect Falun Gong anywhere at any time; silent sit-ins, gatherings, marches or demonstrations to protect or promote Falun Gong; fabricating or spreading rumours to incite social disorder, organising or directing activities to protest relevant government decisions.[9mm]

5.22. The authorities have made a distinction between ordinary followers of Falun Gong, and its leading figures.[9kk] Of the many practitioners rounded up, many were released after 5 to 10 days. [9ww,9zz] Up to 70 organisers have been imprisoned and are likely to face prosecution.[9rr] Cadres, Party members and army officials were urged to quit Falun Gong or face internal discipline or prosecutions.[9oo] An arrest warrant has been issued in respect of Li Hongzhi.[9zz]

5.23. Falun Gong translates as "Wheel of Law". It was founded in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, the group's leader, who lives in USA. It combines elements of Buddhist selfcultivation with traditional physical and breathing exercises to harness "chi" (inner energy or force). Practitioners reportedly eschew medical treatment, and use faith healing. Most are middle-aged and middle-class. Until the crackdown they gathered in parks and open spaces to practice traditional meditation and breathing exercises. Falun Gong practitioners deny that it is a cult with a pernicious political agenda, saying that practice Falun Gong simply to improve their health and become good people with high morals. [9nn,11f,20e,24]

5.24. There are around 17-18 million Muslims in China, many of whom live in compact ethnic communities but have not regularly practiced Islam. The provinces of Xinjiang, Ningxia Hui and Yunnan have large Muslim populations. Ethnically Chinese Hui muslims are generally 'patriotic'; a large number of Uighurs aspire to separate statehood.(see paragraph 5.24)[2b,2c]

5.25. Islamic religious activities are not hindered or harassed on a regular basis to a great extent. However, in areas with a large muslim population such as Xinjiang, officials restrict religious education and the building of mosques. Muslims are permitted to make the Haj to Mecca.[2a,2b]

5.26. Buddhism is practiced in many forms by an estimated 100 million people in China. Most Buddhists are from the Han ethnic group. Han Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the government. Local authorities enforce regulations on places of worship, particularly illegally constructed temples and shrines.[2b,2c,6d]

5.27. However, Tibetan Buddhism is closely associated with proindependence activism. Chinese officials claim that there are about 1,400 monasteries in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism is closely associated with proindependence activism. Non-political forms of worship are tolerated but since May 1996 there has been a "patriotic" campaign to "reeducate" dissident monks in lamaseries. Lamaseries are seen by the authorities as a drain on local resources and a conduit for political infiltration by the Tibetan exile community under the Dalai Lama, the highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism who has lived in exile in India since 1959. Monks and nuns have been among the thousands of Tibetans detained for advocating separatism since 1987. The government maintains management and operational control of the lamaseries and enforces limits on the numbers of monks[2a,2d,6d,7f]

5.28. The majority population of PRC is constituted by the Han ethnic group. 55 officially-designated ethnic minorities constitute just over 8% of China's total population. Most minority groups live in areas they have traditionally inhabited, with standards of living often well below the national average. Ethnic minorities generally do not populate the south and east of China, but there are isolated pockets of minorities throughout these areas. Various minorities are affected by local prejudice, but government policy is non-discriminatory, except for special treatment in some areas (eg. looser family planning controls - see paragraph 6.7). According to the authorities, there are 2.4 million minority cadres. Many members of minorities occupy local leadership slots, and a few have positions of influence at the national level. However, in most areas, ethnic minorities are shut out of positions of real political power, and a tight control over separatist activities is maintained. Opposition to Communist Party rule in minority regions is met with force and heightened security measures.[2b,6e]

5.29. Like other minority ethnic groups, Tibetans receive nominal preferential treatment in marriage policy, university admission and employment. However in practice discrimination against Tibetans is widespread, especially in the area of employment. Central government policies, while helping to raise the economic living standards of many Tibetans, have encouraged a massive influx of Han Chinese into Llasa and other urban areas. Government determination to suppress all separatist activity has led to the violent repression of protest and the detention of numerous Tibetans.[2b,6e]

5.30. As in Tibet, nationalism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is a source of tension between the ethnic population and government. There have been a series of anti-Chinese demonstrations and riots in recent years, and in 1998 bombings and killings of policemen by separatists, leading to crackdowns which have involved the deaths of some protesters and massive arrests. Economic discrimination is also a feature of the region, since most good jobs require fluency in putonghua (Mandarin).[1,2d,3a]

5.31. Hans have outnumbered Mongols in Inner Mongolia since the 1950s (16 million to 2 million). Mongols suffered from violent persecution through the massive purges of the Cultural Revolution. During 1989, major protests occurred in Inner Mongolia as well as in other parts of China, leading to a number of arrests.[3a]

5.32. Article 48 of the 1982 Constitution states that "Women in the PRC enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, political, economic, cultural and social, including family life. The state protects the rights and interests of women, applies the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women alike and trains and selects cadres from among women." The Communist regime has consistently articulated the ideal of gender equality and has enacted a series of laws to protect women's rights. However, the persistence of traditional views on the position of women, the government's family planning policies (see paragraphs 6.5-6.11) and the preference for sons, and the economic reform programme (see paragraph 3.18) are obstacles to the effective application of these laws.[3c]

5.33. Deeply entrenched social habits and customs that mitigate against gender equality are the major cause of the continuing violence against women in China, especially in the rural areas. The roots of this discrimination against women lie in Chinese philosophy, religion and popular culture. The social organisation of rural society, which views women as temporary residents in their natal families until they move to their husband's residence, is also a significant factor. Domestic abuse reportedly is more frequent in rural areas. Women in urban areas are usually more educated and tend to have a better understanding of their rights, although there is no national spousal abuse law. Some localities (eg. Hunan province) have passed legislation to address the problem.[3c,2d]

5.34. The abduction and sale of women is on the rise in China. These practices, which occurred in traditional Chinese society, have seen a resurgence as a result of the economic reform programme which has loosened strict communist moral controls at the same time that it has unleashed the profit motive; the growing shortage of women; and the increase in cost of betrothal gifts. Chinese authorities have consistently condemned the practise of the abduction and sale of women. In 1991 tougher penalties were enacted, imposing sentences of between 10 years in prison and death for gang leaders, up to 3 years in prison for those who buy women and children, and 2-7 years in prison for government cadres who obstruct who obstruct rescue attempts. Campaigns to catch and convict those involved in the abduction of women are regularly organised.[3c,21b] In 1999, police claimed that they had rescued 23,000 women and 4,260 children who were kidnapped, broke up 8,000 kidnapping gangs, and arrested 26,000 people between 1996 and 1998.[9gg]

5.35. It is relatively easy for a woman to get a divorce under China's Marriage Law (1980). Women, however, may be discouraged from applying for a divorce because of the housing shortage in China. During marriage women usually live in a house belonging to their husbands' work unit. After divorce, if a woman's own unit does not assign her a house, she is forced to seek housing with family and friends.[3c]

5.36. The government-sponsored All China Women's Federation (ACWF) plays a key role in promoting and safe-guarding women's rights and interests. The ACWF is a mass organisation, with branches at each government level, and has 89,000 professionals specialised in working with women. Since 1980, the ACWF has sponsored a nationwide effort to develop family planning education, including counselling services. The organisation actively protests cases in which women are discriminated against by the hiring practices of companies and factories. Women's protection committees, medical schemes, domestic abuse hotlines and emergency centres been set up in some areas.[3c,7g,9p]

5.37. The 1992 Law on the Protection of Juveniles forbids infanticide, as well as mistreatment or abandonment of children. Physical abuse of children can be grounds for criminal prosecution. The Constitution provides for 9 years of compulsory education.[2d]

5.38. There have been reports of female infanticide. A World Health Organisation paper in 1997 reported that the national ratio of male to female births was 117:100 (the worldwide statistical norm = 106:100). Part of the gap may be attributable to female infanticide, sex-selective abortion and abandonment; or to the underreporting of female births by couples trying to evade family planning laws to try to have a son (see 'One Child Policy').[2d]

5.39. A number of children are abandoned each year, despite the penalty under law of fines and 5 years in prison. Most of the children in orphanages are female although some are disabled or in poor health. The treatment of children in these institutions varies from adequate to deplorable. Infant mortality rates appear to be very high. Bureaucratic indifference and corruption on the part of orphanage administrators appear to be significant factors in such cases.[2d]

5.40. Legal provisions criminalising homosexuality in China were repealed in 1992. Although sporadic instances of police harassment against homosexuals continue to occur, this reflects traditional social taboos and homophobia rather than systematic official harassment. Gay and lesbian groups, like other social organisations, are monitored for possible political activities.[2a]

6.1. The authorities do not permit the independent monitoring of conditions inside prisons and labour camps. The use of torture and degrading treatment in dealing with detainees is prohibited by law, but systemic weaknesses (such as the reliance on confession evidence) encourage its unofficial use.[2b] There have been a number of reports alleging that confessions were obtained by torture, and of witness statements made under torture or duress.[9e]

6.2. In June 1998 it was reported that the Supreme People's Procuratorate published a series of books designed to improve police practices and further legal reforms. The books admitted that people have been tortured to death while in police custody.[9g,2d]

6.3. It has been estimated that in 1996 several thousand executions were carried out as part of the Strike Hard campaign (see paragraph 3.15). Officials continue to hold mass public sentencing rallies and parades before executions. The revised CPL repealed a 1983 Decision which provided for summary trials in some cases liable to the death penalty. During Strike Hard, numerous executions were carried out for non-violent and economic or relatively minor crimes such as theft, looting relics, luring people into prostitution, serious tax and insurance fraud and repeated petty offending. Hundreds have been executed for drug-related crimes, and for separatist activities in Tibet and Xinjiang.[2b,6b,6c,9m] During 1997 there were fewer executions, but still more than the rest of the world combined.[6k] In 1998, there continued to be numerous executions carried out after summary trials, although the number of death sentences was significantly less than in 1997.[2d]

6.4. In recent years, credible reports have alleged that organs from some executed prisoners are removed and transplanted. Officials have confirmed that executed prisoners are among the sources of organs for transplant, but deny that their trade exists. There is no national legislation governing organ donations, but officials assert that consent is required from prisoners or their relatives before organs are removed.[2b,13c]

6.5. Since the 1970s the government has been implementing the one child policy, with the aim of reducing pressures on the country's resources and infrastructure aggravated by the rate of population growth. The policy consists of four basic demands; few births, late marriage, late childbearing, and eugenic births. The central government has been responsible for initiating the policy and for setting an annual nationwide target for population growth, co-ordinated by the State Planning Commission, but its interpretation and implementation are left to provincial and municipal regulators to adapt according to local conditions.[3d,3a]

6.6. The policy provides for minimum marriage ages for men (22) and women (20), an "encouraged minimum child-bearing age (24), the widespread promotion of birth control and abortion, and for one child per couple except in certain circumstances (see paragraph 6.7). It is implemented through education, propaganda, and a combination of incentives such as health subsidies and financial bonuses, and disincentives, such as additional taxes and legal discrimination.[3c,3a] Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy include fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and other administrative punishments that sometimes result in loss of employment.[2a,3a,3c] Levels of fines vary by region; in Shanghai, the fine for violating birth quotas is three times the combined annual salary of the parents, while in Zhejiang province it is 20% of the parents' salary paid over 5 years. Unpaid fines have sometimes resulted in confiscation or destruction of homes and personal property by local authorities.[2d]

6.7. There are regional and urban/rural differences in the implementation of the family planning regulations. Urban couples seldom obtain permission to have a second child, although urban couples who were themselves only children may have two children. Exceptions are allowed for many of the 70% of Han who live in rural areas, all of whom in some provinces are permitted two children, and ethnic minorities are subject to less stringent population controls. Minorities in some rural areas are permitted to have four children.[2b,2d] Official figures from a 1995 survey indicated that 25% of women of child-bearing age have 3 or more children.[2d]

6.8. Each work unit (factory, office, village etc.) is allocated a target of 'authorised' births for the following two or three years. The effect of these targets can be to regulate not only the number of births per couple, but also the timing of births. The government opposes the use of force or coercion in implementing family planning regulations, but the imposition of penalties on local officials failing to meet the targets of the birth quota system puts them under intense pressure.[3d]

6.9. Women with unauthorised pregnancies can be placed under extreme psychological pressure to take "remedial measures" from other members of their work units, and in ideological work sessions with family planning agents.[3d,2a]

6.10. Government officials have acknowledged that there have been instances of forced abortions and sterilisations, and there are anecdotal accounts of raids on rural villages by task forces rounding up women for forced sterilisation or abortion.[3d,17b] The 1989 Administrative Procedure Law, enacted in October 1990, allows citizens to sue family planning officials for misdeeds.[3d]

6.11. Nevertheless, Chinese women are averaging over two births each. In the larger cities, many people would opt to have only one child without government pressure, for economic and employment reasons. Those less reliant on the benefits of the work unit, such as transients (see paragraph 6.21-6.22) and farmers in remote rural areas are typically able to have two or more children.[3d,10a,2c]

6.12. The Constitution states that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are enjoyed by all citizens. However, the government interprets CCP's leading role as circumscribing these rights. It does not permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticism of senior leaders or opinions that contradict basic CCP doctrine providing for a socialist state under the Party's leadership. The Law on the Protection of State Secrets gives a general and broad definition of state secrets, which includes the "secrets of political parties if they are deemed to affect the security and interests of the state." Since the affairs of the CCP are intricately linked to those of the state, this effectively bans public reporting or debate of any political issue that the CCP authorities decide should not be disclosed.[2b,6g]

6.13. Journalists are permitted to report in areas of economic and legal reform but are not free to report on political reform. Those who air their views in Hong Kong and Taiwan newspapers may be subject to petty sanctions, such as exit permits denied, housing entitlements revoked and periodic police detention and questioning. The formal charges brought against the dissident Wang Dan were based on public criticisms of the government; his sentence in 1996 to 11 years imprisonment was much harsher than was imposed for his pro-democracy activities in 1989. In the face of ideological controls, many intellectuals and scholars exercise self-censorship.[2b,3e]

6.14. China is undergoing a communications revolution and despite government controls, information is flowing into China at an increasing rate. The use of shortwave radio is unrestricted; and Chinese language broadcasts of the BBC and Voice of America are widely listened to. Access to satellite television broadcasts and most sites on the Internet is spreading. China has announced curbs on electronic media designed to block pornography and other forms of spiritual pollution.[2b] In January 1999, Lin Hai was sentenced to 2 years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power". He had supplied a US-based dissident magazine with 30,000 mainland e-mail addresses.[11a]

6.15. In June 1998, US President Clinton made a nine day tour of China. During his visit, he was given three opportunities to speak directly to the Chinese public through television and radio broadcasts.[18]

6.16. President Jiang has ordered senior officials to step up ideological vigilance and keep a tight grip on the media and other channels of mass communication during 1999.[9u]

6.17. While the Constitution has provisions for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the government severely restricts these rights in practice. Such activities must not infringe upon the interests of the State, or protest against the political system or its leaders. Authorities deny permits and quickly move to suppress demonstrations involving expression of dissident political views. Demonstrations about non-political grievances are tolerated; unauthorized protests (assembly, demonstration marches and petitions) on non-political subjects are on the increase and are not automatically disrupted.[11e] However, it is not always possible to draw a clear distinction between political and non-political demonstrations; often the decision is left to local authorities who can react in varying ways.[2b]

6.18. The Chinese government estimates that there are around a million organisations in the country working in a range of fields. They are tolerated by the authorities as long as they avoid what the Communist Party considers to be direct challenges to CCP authority or government policy. In October 1998, the fledgling China Development Union, which had organised seminars on China's politics and economy, was shut down.[19]

6.19. China's sole officially recognised workers' organisation, the All China Federation of Trades Unions (ACFTU), is controlled by the Communist Party. Independent trades unions are illegal. Since October 1997, when China signed the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which provides for the right to form independent trades unions, to strike and to demonstrate) a group of activists has started a campaign to promote independent trades unions. The convention has not yet been ratified by the NPC.[2d]

6.20. The "iron rice bowl" work unit system has, since the 1950s, provided a means by which the CCP has controlled and restricted the Chinese population. Under the system, individuals are issued with a registration card (hukou), which records permission to work and reside in an area, and also allocation of various benefits. Another factor in the control system is the work unit (danwei) attached to every state enterprise or collective, including schools, factories, research institutes and offices. The CCP officials of the danwei control access to tickets for out of town travel, authorise passports and marriages, and allocate state-insured benefits.[3a]

6.21. With the reforms of the 1990s - liberalisation of the economy, increased privatisation, increased ability for individuals to decide how they want to earn a living - the importance of the hukou has diminished. It is being replaced by the individual identity card (jumin shenfenzheng). Tickets may now be purchased without any ID card. There is also a burgeoning market in counterfeit identity cards. The need for a supplemental work force in the areas of fastest economic growth has led to tolerance of a large itinerant population that is not in compliance with formal requirements to obtain permission to change residence. Since this population lacks legal status, access to housing, schooling and the full range of employment opportunities is restricted. National and regional authorities have been encouraged to regulate and manage the transient population. [2a,2c,7h]

6.22. Nevertheless, booming coastal cities have attracted a "floating" population of 80-130 million, and private firms and foreign joint ventures have drawn over four million workers from state-run enterprises. The floating population includes many unskilled rural workers, and a growing number of middle-class professionals. Some cities, such as Beijing, are beginning to offer social services free of charge. In August 1998, the PSB issued revised regulations that allow persons from the countryside to apply for permanent residence in a city.[2d]

6.23. The government routinely permits most legal emigration and most private foreign travel. Individuals are often required to obtain a passport, an exit permit, a visa and a second exit permit. Both exit permits are issued by the Public Security Bureau. Written permission from the work unit is a pre-requisite. The purpose of the second exit permit has seemed not to be to "control exit" (the stated purpose of the first form) but rather to allow for an exiting emigrant to be de-registered from neighbourhood, work unit and other records.[2a]

6.24. Special exit permit requirements imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre were lifted after a couple of years. Regulations adopted in 1994 permit a Chinese citizen to exit the country without an exit permit if the traveller has travelled abroad at least once before for the same purpose.[2a]

6.25. The government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have entered other countries or territories illegally. Returnees generally are fined. Those who have been repatriated a second time typically are sent to labour camp in addition to being fined again. Those who are identified as people smugglers ("snakeheads") are liable to criminal prosecution.[2a] The Chinese police have initiated a campaign against illegal migration, targeting Fujian, Guangdon, Zhejiang, Guangxi and northern Liaoning.[9ff]

Political leaders:

Chiang Kai-shek President of Republic of China 1928-1949; after defeat by the Communists, led the regime in Taiwan until death in 1975.

Deng Xiaoping Variously, General Secretary of CCP and influential leader during 1960s- 1990s. Policies of open door and economic reform.

Hu Yaobang General Secretary of CCP 1981-1987. Death in April 1989 led to student demonstrations.

Jiang Zemin President of PRC since 1993; CCP General Secretary since 1989.

Li Peng Premier of PRC 1988 - March 1998. Head of Parliament March 1998 - .

Mao Zedong Chairman of CCP 1935-1976. Head of State 949-1958. Architect of the Cultural Revolution.

Tung Chee-hwa Chief Executive of HKSAR.

Yang Shankun President of PRC 1988-1993. Died September 1998.

Zhao Ziyang Holder of senior CCP posts until dismissed following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.

Zhou Enlai Premier of PRC 1949-1976.

Zhu Rongji Premier of PRC March 1998 - .

Political dissidents:

Bao Ge Activist in seeking compensation for Japanese wartime atrocities in China. Sentenced to 3 years reeducation through labour in 1994. Left for USA November 1997.

Chen Longde Sent to labour camp 1996 after calling for release of Wei Jingsheng.

Li Hongzhi Falun Gong leader. US resident.

Liu Jingsheng Jailed 1992, sentenced to 15 years for subversion.

Qin Yongmin Sentenced to 12 years in prison in December 1998 in crackdown on dissidents.

Sun Liyong Jailed 1990 after demanding release of 1989 activists, sentenced to 7 years.

Wang Bingzhang US-based activist arrested and expelled to Los Angeles in February 1998. Had entered PRC under a false name intending to set up "Justice Party".

Wang Dan Activist in 1989 demonstrations. Released from detention February 1993 but rearrested May 1995. 11 year sentence imposed October 1996. Released on medical parole to USA April 1998; enrolled as Harvard student.

Wang Youcai Detained 1989-91. Arrested June 1998 after abandoning attempt to register China Democratic Party with Zhejiang provincial authorities. Sentenced to 11 years in prison in December 1998.

Wei Jingsheng Activist in Democracy Wall Movement, imprisoned 1979-1993 foll. Rearrested April 1994, sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Released on medical parole and voluntary exile to USA November 1997.

Xu Wenli Democracy Wall activist, served 12 years. Lives in Beijing. Critical of Wei Jingsheng's stance. Sentenced to 13 years in prison in December 1998 after unsuccessful attempt to set up Democracy Party.

1949 1 October: the founding of the People's Republic of China proclaimed by the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.

1950: Beginning of Land Reform, which by 1953 involved the appropriation and redistribution of 200m. acres, and violent class struggle against landlords and wealthy peasants. Also the beginning of Thought Reform for intellectuals.

1954 : The first Constitution adopted.

1957 May-June: The Hundred Flowers movement. Intellectuals and students invited to constructively criticise the CCP.

8 June: Anti-Rightist campaign launched - crackdown on nearly 3m. rightist elements, including many of whom had spoken out during the Hundred Flowers movement.

1958 : The Great Leap Forward launched.

1959-61: The "Three Bitter Years" of famine.

1966-76: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution - rise of the Red Guards, the Cult of Mao, widespread violence and anarchy, persecution of millions. Deng Xiaoping and other officials purged.

1975: New Constitution adopted. Deng Xiaoping rehabilitated.

1976 8 January: Death of Premier Zhou Enlai.

April: Demonstrations in Tiananmen Square mourning Zhou Enlai violently dispersed. Deng Xiaoping again purged.

9 September: Death of Mao Zedong.

October: Arrest of Gang of Four. Control assumed by Hua Guofeng.

1977 July: Deng Xiaoping rehabilitated.

1978: China's third constitution introduced. Beginning of Democracy Wall movement, with large posters and demonstrations calling for reform and democracy. Third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee marked the beginning of Deng's era, with repudiation of the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution and launch of economic reforms.

1979 29 March: Wei Jingsheng, a Democracy Wall leading figure, arrested and sentenced for "counter- revolutionary" crimes.

1 July: Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law adopted by the fifth National People's Congress.

6 December: Democracy Wall closed down.

1980: One-child policy announced. Economic reform initiated, expanding the role of market forces.

1982: Fourth Constitution promulgated.

1983: Launch of campaigns against crime, resulting in thousands of arrests and executions, against radical elements within the CCP, and against "spiritual pollution" ie. Western influences.

1986: Revival of the Hundred Flowers movement, followed by widespread student protests calling for increased democracy and better living conditions.

1987: Hu Yaobang, CCP General Secretary, forced to resign and replaced by Zhao Ziyang. Beginning of campaign against Western bourgeois liberalisation.

1989 15 April: Death of Hu Yaobang.

18 April: 4,000 students place a banner in Tiananmen Square commemorating Hu.

22 April: Amid spreading protests, 50,000 students occupy Tiananmen Square overnight for Hu's funeral.

Up to 150,000 students march into Tiananmen Square.

13 May: Beginning of hunger strike in Tiananmen Square for several hundred students.

17 May: Protests spread to other cities. Zhao Ziyang unsuccessful in persuading students to leave Tiananmen Square. Hunger strikers now numbered 3,000. Mass marches in Beijing include one million citizens.

20 May: Martial law in Beijing announced.

3-4 June: Soldiers clash with demonstrators, killing hundreds and clearing Tiananmen Square. Arrests and detentions across the country number in the thousands.

24 June: Zhao Ziyang ousted and replaced by Jiang Zemin.

October: New regulations compelled legal registration of all social organisations; other regulations required prior approval of the Public Security Bureau of all assemblies, demonstrations and parades.

November: Resignation of Deng Xiaoping from his last government position (Chairman of Central Military Commission); replaced by Jiang Zemin.

1990 10 January: Martial law lifted in Beijing.

18 January: Release of 573 dissidents.

10 May: Release of 211 dissidents.

December: Beginning of trials for numerous prominent dissidents.

1992: Deng Xiaoping tour of southern areas, including the Special Economic Zones, calling for increase in the pace of economic growth and intensification of his reformist policies. 14th National Congress appointed new younger Politburo and Standing Committee, and appointed Jiang Zemin as President of the PRC.

1993: Launch of campaign against corruption within CCP, state bureaucracy and economic enterprises. Fourth constitution amended.

1995: CCP leadership announced that ultimate Party authority passed to younger 21 member Politburo.

1996 April: Launch of 'Strike Hard' campaign against crime, resulting in hundreds of executions and life sentences.

1997 January: Criminal Procedure Law revised, including increased protections for detainees.

February: Death of Deng Xiaoping.

July: Handover of Hong Kong; formation of the Special Administrative Region (SAR).

October: 15th Party Congress, at which Jiang Zemin outlined reform of the state owned enterprises and gave a clear signal that the leadership is addressing the issue seriously. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights signed.

1998 March: Jiang Zemin re-elected as President. Zhu Rongji became Premier.

April: Wang Dan paroled to USA.

May: Legco elections.

June: Clinton visit, televised live. Dissidents fail in attempt to register legitimate opposition party. Demonstration commemorating Tiananmen Square passes without obstruction in Hong Kong.

October: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed on eve of UK PM's visit.

1999 May: Nato forces bombed Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

July: Tensions increased following Taiwan's demand for "state-to-state" relations.

October: National day marked 50 years of Communist rule. Preceded by severe security measures- detentions and limits on movement.

ACWF All China Women's Federation

Basic Law Constitution of HKSAR

cadre elite CCP members

CCP Chinese Communist Party

danwei work/welfare unit

hukou (or hukoushu household registration booklet

jumin shenfenzheng individual registration card

lamaseries Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries

NPC National People's Congress

PRC People's Republic of China

PLA People's Liberation Army

PSB Public Security Bureau

SAR (also HKSAR) Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong)

snakeheads organisers of illegal people smuggling

[1] Europa Yearbook 1998

[2] US State Department

(a) Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, December 1995

(b) Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, January 1997

(c) Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum Applications, May 1994

(d) Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, February 1999

[3] Documentation, Immigration and Research Branch, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada

(a) Country Profile, 1991

(b) The Hunt for Dissidents in China, October 1990

(c) Women in China, September 1993

(d) One-child Policy Update, January 1995

(e) Economic Growth and Human Rights, December 1993

(f) China: Political Dissent - an Update, June 1995

[4] Washington Quarterly, Winter 1990; Tiananmen: Causes and Consequences, G.W. Gong

[5] Nahan, memorial issue, 1989

[6] Amnesty International

(a) China: The Massacre of June 1989 and its Aftermath, 1990

(b) PRC: Law Reform and Human Rights, March 1997

(c) The Death Penalty in China: Breaking Records, Breaking Rules, August 1997

(d) Repression in Tibet, May 1992

(e) Crackdown on Tibetan Dissent Continues, September 1995

(f) Women in China: Detained, Victimised but Mobilised, July 1996

(g) State Secrets: a Pretext for Repression, May 1996

(h) Nine Years After Tiananmen - Still a "Counter- revolutionary Riot"?, June 1998

(i) HKSAR Human Rights One Year on: No Room for Complacency, June 1998

(j) Dissidents detained since 1992,January 1994

(k) The Death Penalty in 1997, September 1998

(j) No Improvement in human rights, March 1999

[7] Summary of World Broadcasts

(a) China's Criminal Law; Xinhua news agency, 17.3. 1997

(b) 17 November 1997, China tells UN...; Xinhua news agency

(c) 27 November 1997, Corruption; Fazhi Ribao

4. 20 November 1997, Non-Communist parties; Renmin Ribao
5. (e) 24 November 1997, Chief Executive welcomes...; Xinhua

(f) 13 December 1997, Tibet official pledges...; Xizang Ribao

(g) 19 January 1994, Beijing makes effort...; Xinhua

(h) 29 November 1997, Migrant workers; Fazhi Ribao

(i) 19 November 1997, China to implement new...; Xinhua

(j) 13 July 1998, First ever televised...; Xinhua

(k) 21 July 1998, Corruption reporting network...; Xinhua

(l) 17 March 1998, NPC elects...; Xinhua

[8] Report by UNESCO Working Group on Arbitrary Dentention, December 1997

[9] Reuters Business Briefing

(a) 8 December 1997, Procurator-General...; Xinhua

(b) 17 December 1997, Wang Dan's family complains..; SCMP

(c) 7 November 1997, Britain's Hong Kong Envoy...; Reuters

(d) 3 July 1998,Dissidents find tolerance...; Reuters

(e) 3 July 1998, Amnesty asks China...; Reuters

(f) 2 July 1998, Chinese dissidents shelve...; Reuters

(g) 30 June 1998, China admits torture...; ABIX

(h) 23 June 1998, More Chinese families...; CBNet

(i) 19 June 1998, Independent judiciary...; Xinhua

(j) 3 June 1998, Ordinary Chinese win...; Illawarra Mercury

(k) 2 July 1998, China's blossoming legal...; Journal of Commerce

(l) 29 October 1998, Democracy group shut down; Sydney Morning Herald

(m) 30 October 1998, Province executes 21...; Reuters

(n) 11 September 1998, Shenzhen cracks down...; Reuters

(o) 8 July 1998, Bureaucracy slim-down...; Reuters

(p) 5 September 1998, War against family violence...; Xinhua

(q) 8 February 1999, China challenges HK...; Reuters

(r) 6 October 1998, Dissidents give wary welcome...; Reuters;

(s) 3 December 1998, Swoop on dissidents; Australian

(t) 18 January 1999, 17% out of work; China Daily

(u) 22 January 1999, Jiang orders tight...; Reuters

(v) 28 January 1999, China publishes 20m...; Xinhua

23. 3 February 1999, 400k to cross...; HongKong Standard
24. 10 February 1999, China reports 2,500… Reuters Ltd
25. 13 April 1999, China says rectifies…. Reuters Ltd
26. 25 April 1999, Healing organisation… Kyodo News Service
27. 29 April 1999, China adopts law… Xinhua News Agency
28. 5 May 1999, Key right of abode… South China Morning Post
29. 9 May 1999, Protests in major…, Straits Times
30. 12 May 1999, view from Beijing…, Straits Times
31. 17 May 1999, US Embassy…, Xinhua News Agency
32. 9 June 1999, Chinese chop at… Australian
33. 9 June 1999, Police smash abduction… Mirror
34. 27 June 1999, Hong Kong lawyers'…, Independent on Sunday
35. 10 July 1999, Cult leader… BBC Monitoring Service
36. 10 July 1999, Authorities smash…, BBC Monitoring Service
37. 23 July 1999, Chinese government will…, Xinhua News Agency
38. 25 July 1999, China nabs 5,000.., Reuters Ltd
39. 26 July 1999, Amnesty International…, M2 Communications Ltd
40. 5 August 1999, Can China defy…, Korea Herald
41. 8 August 1999, Sect leaders…, South China Morning Post
42. 19 August 1999, China says ready…, Reuters Ltd
43. 24 August 1999, China to prosecute…, Reuters Ltd
44. 26 August 1999, US slams China's…, Kyodo News
45. 27 August 1999, China cracks down…, Independent
46. 31 August 1999, US compensates…, Reuters Ltd
47. 10 September 1999, Christians face harsh…, South China Morning Post
48. 11 September 1999, China stages huge…, Reuters Ltd
49. 13 September 1999, Communists handle… Economist Intelligence Unit
50. 14 September 1999, China executes…, Daily Telegraph
51. 15 September 1999, Police round up…, Xinhua News Agency
52. 19 September 1999, China cracks down…., Reuters Ltd

[10] Newsweek

(a) 22 January 1996

(b) 24 November 1997

(c) 29 September 1997

[11] Independent newspaper

(a) 22 January 1999, Chinese jail man...

(b) 24 November 1997

(c) 15 July 1998, migrant gangs...

(d) 20 June 1998, One-Chop Zhu...

(e) 12 November 1998, Angry Chinese join...(with Irish Times article)

(f) 23 July 1999, Chinese ban mass cult…

[12] Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999

[13] Daily Telegraph

(a) 27 December 1997

(b) 24 February 1998

(c) 25 February 1998

(d) 5 June 1998, forced to remember...

(e) 11 July 1998, airport launches...

[14] Land Administration Law (amended) 1988

[15] Foreign and Commonwealth advice, 8 January 1998

[16] Times newspaper

(a) 13 January 1998

(c) 9 March 1998, 3.5m jobs loss...

[17] South China Morning Post

(a) 9 January 1998, Vietnamese refugee...

(b) 31 October 1998, Ban imposed on...

[18] Los Angeles Times, 30 June 1998

[19] Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1998

[20] Guardian newspaper

(a) 26 May 1998, Hong Kong poll...

(b) 15 September 1998, Beijing shows envoy...

(c) 12 November 1998, Money troubles breed...

(d) 10 February 1999, China attacks powers...

(e) 23 July 1999, Greatest threat…

[21] Sunday Telegraph

(a) 1 February 1998, Jobs catastrophe...

(b) 22 November 1998, Brides for sale...

(c) 17 January 1999, China targets the party...

[22] Keesings Record of World Events

(a) December 1998

[23] Christian Solidarity Worldwide

1. Religious Freedom Denied in China, August 1998
2. Chinese arrest 30, August 1999-09-29

[24] Evening Standard, Inside the world…, 25 August 1999

[25] UNESCO: Letter from China permanent representative, 6 August 1999