1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a variety of sources.

1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims made in the United Kingdom. It represents the current assessment by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the general socio-political and human rights situation in the country.

1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain.

1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.

1.5 The assessment has been placed on the Internet (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/cipu1.htm). An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following organizations:

- Amnesty International UK

- Immigration Advisory Service

- Immigration Appellate Authority

- Immigration Law Practitioners' Association

- Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants

- JUSTICE

- Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture

- Refugee Council

- Refugee Legal Centre

- UN High Commissioner for Refugees

2.1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan lies in southern Asia, bordered by India to the east and Afghanistan and Iran to the west. It has a short frontier with the People's Republic of China in the far north-east. The capital is Islamabad. The country covers an area of about 307,374 square miles. The Pakistani-held part of Kashmir, known as Azad Kashmir, which is broadly responsible for its own internal administration, covers an additional 4,494 square miles and had a population of 1,980,000 (according to the 1981 census). [1]

2.2 Pakistan is divided into four provinces: Baluchistan; North-West Frontier Province; Punjab and Sindh - and the tribal areas under federal administration. The provinces are autonomous units. [1] According to the March 1998 census, Pakistan has a population of 130.58 million (72.585 million in Punjab; 29.991 million in the Sindh; 17.555 million in the North-West Frontier Province; and 6.511 million in Baluchistan). [6u]

2.3 The main ethnic group is Punjabi, comprising about two-thirds of the population. Other major groups are the Sindhis (13%), Pathans (aka Pashtuns, Pushtoons or Pukhtoons) (8.5%), Urdu (7.6%), Baluchis (2.5%) and Mohajirs. [20]

2.4 The principal languages are Punjabi (the language usually spoken in 48.2% of households in 1981), Pushto (13.1%), Sindhi (11.8%) and Saraiki (9.8%). Urdu is the national language, spoken by 7.6% of the population. English is also extensively used. [1] Each ethnic group has its own language and numerous dialects are spoken. [3]

2.5 Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the distribution of wealth between social classes. Its per capita annual income is $490. Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice and leather products are the principal exports. The economy includes both state-run and private industries and financial institutions. [2] During 1990-96 the average annual rate of inflation was 11%; about 5.4% of the labour force were estimated to be unemployed in 1996-7. [1]

2.6 The Constitution provides for the right of private businesses to operate freely in most sectors of the economy. The Government made several economic reforms, including privatising state-owned enterprises and reducing tariffs, in 1998. Politically driven confrontations with Independent Power Projects, and the Government's inability to repay investors in hard currency, have damaged investor confidence and hampered privatisation. [2]

2.7 In his address to Parliament in February 1998, the President declared that the most serious problem facing the country at the present time was its bad financial and economic condition. He regretted that progress towards an Islamic economy during the last 25 years had been slow and that they had failed to establish a comprehensive Islamic economic system. He also said that is was essential to consider the system of collecting the Islamic tithe. He said that he expected the implementation of the programme to end poverty so that the less fortunate people could also share in the country's progress and prosperity. [8e]

See also Sharia Law: paragraphs 4.2.12 - 4.2.18.

2.8 Pakistan's reaction to India's five nuclear tests with six of their own in May 1998 triggered [swift] sanctions from the US, Japan and a number of European countries. In light of the country's economic crisis, with dwindling foreign reserves and possible default on prior debt obligations, the US, in addition to other members of the G-7, later permitted limited financial assistance. In July 1998 a waiver was granted for the sale of food grains. Such assistance may have come in exchange for guarantees from the Sharif government that Pakistan would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. [21b]

2.9 On 14 January 1999 the IMF approved a package of US $575 million in loans under the enhanced structural adjustment facility, which had been suspended since the nuclear tests. In return the Government gave guarantees of continued financial reforms, trade liberalisation and privatisation. The IMF noted that in 1997-98 Pakistan had achieved a growth in GDP of 5.4%, and had held inflation to less than 8%. [24h]

3.1 Pakistan was created in August 1947 by the partition of the Indian Empire into the independent states of India and Pakistan, in response to demands by elements of the Muslim population in the sub-continent for the establishment of a specifically Muslim state. Pakistan originally comprised two distinct regions, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by some 1,600 km of Indian territory. The leader of the dominant Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), became the first governor-general of Pakistan but died in 1948. Having been a Dominion with the British monarch as Head of State, the country became a republic within the Commonwealth on 23 March 1956 when the first Constitution was promulgated. Major-General Iskander Mirza became Pakistan's first president. [1]

3.2 In 1958 the President abrogated the Constitution, declared martial law, dismissed the national and provincial governments and dissolved all political parties. Shortly afterwards General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the Martial Law Administrator appointed by Mirza, removed Mirza from office and became president himself. Following widespread unrest Ayub Khan was forced to resign in March 1969. He was replaced by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army who reimposed martial law. [1]

3.3 In December 1970 the first general election was held for a national assembly. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League, which advocated autonomy for East Pakistan, won almost all the seats in the East, thus gaining an absolute majority in the National Assembly, while the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, won a majority of seats in the west. The East declared itself independent as the People's Republic of Bangladesh on 23 March 1971 following the failure of negotiations to achieve a coalition government. Civil war broke out and in December 1971 the Indian army intervened to support the Bengalis: the Pakistani army was forced to withdraw. Yahya Khan resigned, military rule ended, and Bhutto became the new president. [1]

3.4 Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth in January 1972. Bhutto became executive Prime Minister after the new Constitution of August 1973 provided for a parliamentary system of government. The PPP won the March 1977 elections, but the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) accused the PPP of electoral malpractice and launched a campaign of civil disobedience. Armed clashes took place between the army and demonstrators. In July 1977 Bhutto was deposed in a bloodless coup and a martial law regime was instituted with General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Bhutto was charged with instigating the murder of a PPP dissident and was sentenced to death. He was executed in April 1979. [1]

3.5 General Zia became president in September 1978, and elections were indefinitely postponed with the opposition to the military regime being severely suppressed. In March 1981 the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was formed, which advocated an end to military rule and a return to a parliamentary system of government. In 1983 the MRD launched a civil disobedience campaign which was supported in Sindh where anti-Government protests resulted in numerous deaths. The campaign ended in December 1983 and many political leaders and activists, including Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the former Prime Minister, were imprisoned or went into exile. [1]

3.6 General Zia's regime pursued a policy of "Islamisation" of the country's institutions, including the enforcement of Islamic penal codes. A referendum held in December 1984 endorsed this policy, although there were widespread allegations of electoral malpractice. [1]

3.7 A general election was held in February 1985, followed shortly afterwards by provincial assembly elections. The elections were held on a non-party basis, but dissatisfaction with the regime was indicated by the defeat of several cabinet ministers and Zia supporters. The Pagaro Group of the Pakistan Muslim League and former members of the PPP formed the largest two groupings in the National Assembly. In March 1985 Muhammad Khan Junejo, a member of the Pagaro Group, was appointed Prime Minister and a largely civilian cabinet was formed. [1]

3.8 On 30 December 1985 General Zia announced the repeal of martial law and the restoration of the 1973 Constitution, as amended in October 1985 (the "Eighth Amendment" which introduced an executive presidency with the power to dismiss the National Assembly, Prime Minister and Cabinet, and which indemnified all actions of the military regime during the previous eight years). The MRD continued to demand the restoration of the unamended 1973 Constitution, and the cause was strengthened by the return from exile in April 1986 of Benazir Bhutto, who travelled throughout the country holding political rallies. In August the Government banned rallies scheduled for Independence Day and detained hundreds of opposition members, including Benazir Bhutto. The arrests provoked violent anti-Government demonstrations in a number of cities. [1]

3.9 General Zia in May 1988 dismissed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, dissolved the National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies. Elections were to be held in November, but on 17 August 1988 General Zia was killed in an air crash in mysterious circumstances in eastern Pakistan. [1]

3.10 The elections took place as scheduled, with the PPP winning 93 of the 207 directly elective seats. The Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, IJI), a grouping of 9 Islamic and right wing parties including the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), won 54 seats. The remaining 58 seats went to independents and smaller parties. A coalition government was formed by the PPP and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) [1] (renamed the Muttahida Qaumi Movement in 1997) [12g] and Benazir Bhutto was appointed Prime Minister on 1 December 1988. [1]

3.11 Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth on 1 October 1989. During 1989 the coalitions formed by the PPP in the provincial assemblies came under pressure and eventually in October the MQM withdrew its parliamentary support, claiming that the PPP had failed to honour any of its promises made in the original co-operation agreement. A "no confidence" motion was defeated in November 1989. The Government was accused of corruption, political bribery and mismanagement. Violence erupted in Sindh province between supporters of the PPP and MQM. The situation declined considerably and on 6 August 1990 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Prime Minister and her Cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly. He accused the Government of corruption, nepotism and incompetence, charges denied by Benazir Bhutto. [1]

See also Security: paragraphs 4.3.1 - 4.3.9; and Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

3.12 A general election took place on 24 October 1990. The IDA doubled its representation in the National Assembly, leaving it 4 seats short of a majority, while the People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) of the PPP and three smaller parties suffered a heavy defeat. On 6 November Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the PML, was elected Prime Minister. [1]

3.13 In May 1991 the National Assembly adopted legislation imposing the incorporation of Sharia, the Islamic legal code, into Pakistan's legal system. Legislation was also adopted which provided for the Islamisation of the educational, economic and judicial systems. [1]

See also Sharia Law: paragraphs 4.2.12 - 4.2.18; and Women: paragraphs 5.3.83 - 5.3.100.

3.14 Later in 1991 open confrontation between the IDA and the PPP worsened and hundreds of PPP supporters were arrested in Sindh province. "Operation Blue Fox" (also known as "Operation Clean-up") was launched in May 1992 in response to the continuing situation in Sindh, and in which the army was to seize unauthorised weapons and apprehend criminals and terrorists. There was a violent clash between two factions of the MQM (the majority Altaf faction and the small breakaway Haqiqi faction) in Karachi, as well as between the MQM and the PPP. The army took the opportunity to suppress extremist elements in the MQM. The Government repeatedly gave assurances that the operation was aimed at criminals and not at the MQM itself. [1] & [3]

See also Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

3.15 In November 1992 the PDA intensified its campaign of political agitation. The rallies and marches organised by Benazir Bhutto were suppressed by the Government through mass arrests, road blocks and the imposition of a two month ban on the holding of public meetings in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. [1]

3.16 During 1993 the rift between the President and the Prime Minister grew, (a rift caused by the Government initiating discussions regarding proposed amendments to the Eighth Constitutional Amendment) and on 18 April the National Assembly was dissolved and the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were dismissed. The President accused Sharif of "maladministration, nepotism and corruption". An acting Prime Minister and Cabinet were appointed, but on 26 May the Supreme Court ordered that the National Assembly, Prime Minister and Cabinet be restored to power as the President's order had been unconstitutional. The National Assembly and Sharif's government were reinstated immediately. [1]

3.17 An All Parties Conference, which included Benazir Bhutto, urged the President to dissolve the National Assembly and hold fresh elections. Benazir announced a "long march" with the intention of laying siege to the capital and forcing Sharif to resign. The army persuaded Benazir to postpone the march. On 18 July 1993 both the President and Sharif resigned, and the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies were dissolved. [1]

3.18 The elections were held on 6 and 9 October 1993 and were widely considered to be fair. Neither the PPP nor the Sharif faction of the PML won an outright majority in the federal elections and only the PPP won a majority in the provincial elections, in Sindh. Benazir Bhutto was elected to head a coalition government on 19 October. The PPP led coalition assumed control of the provincial administration in Punjab in alliance with the minor renegade PML faction, the PML(J), and also Sindh, while the governments in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan were headed by alliances led by the PML (N). [1]

3.19 September 1994 saw an upsurge in political unrest when Sharif organised a nation-wide general strike. Hundreds of PML supporters, including Sharif's father were arrested. In Karachi there was escalating ethnic and criminal violence, which stemmed from the rivalry of the opposing MQM factions, while other killings were linked to drugs mafia and sectarian disputes between Shia and Sunni Muslims. It was estimated that during 1995 almost 2,000 people were killed in Karachi as a result of political and ethnic violence. [1]

See also Shia Muslims: paragraphs 5.3.53 - 5.3.59; and Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

3.20 In mid-June 1996 an austere budget was introduced, including the introduction of new taxes, which sparked off protests. The volatile political situation was intensified by a large bomb explosion at Lahore airport in July, a series of public sector strikes and a resurgence of violence in Karachi. Benazir's estranged brother, Mir Murtaza Bhutto, was killed in a gun battle with police in Karachi in mid-September. The Prime Minister and her husband were accused of organising the killing, while Benazir implied that she believed the President and the army were to blame. A judicial tribunal exonerated the President of any involvement in the killing and described the death as an "extra-judicial killing". [1] & [6e]

3.21 Against a background of rising public discontent President Leghari dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government and dissolved the National Assembly on 5 November 1996. The state assemblies were dissolved over the following week. The reasons given by the President were the deteriorating law and order situation, severe economic problems, widespread corruption, disregard for judicial authority and the violation of various constitutional provisions. [1]

3.22 The general election was held on 3 February 1997 with a low turnout of 30%-40%. The PML (Nawaz) won a decisive victory, gaining 134 of the 204 directly elective seats in the National Assembly. The PPP was routed, both at federal and state level, winning only 18 National Assembly seats. The MQM emerged as the country's third political force with 12 seats. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 February 1997. [1]

See also Election Results: paragraphs 4.1.9 - 4.1.11.

3.23 Sharif strengthened his political authority in April 1997 when he engineered the repeal of the major components of the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment by the National Assembly and the Senate. The president lost his powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to dissolve the legislature, to order a national referendum on any issue, and to appoint provincial Governors, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three armed forces chiefs. The president thus became a largely ceremonial figure. [1]

3.24 According to Amnesty International, sectarian violence escalated between the Shia and Sunni communities during the first half of 1997 in the Punjab and Sindh provinces. The new government called on religious groups to restrain their followers and banned motorcycle pillion riding, as many attacks had been carried out by pillion riders. The Chief Justice of Pakistan, mindful of concerns about human rights abuses, initiated public hearings into the killings in Karachi and the sectarian violence in Punjab. The Government introduced an Anti-Terrorism Bill in the National Assembly, which was passed and signed into law by the President on 17 August 1997. The Bill was controversial as it gave the police sweeping powers. [4d]

See also Anti-Terrorism Act: paragraphs 4.2.8 - 4.2.11.

3.25 Pakistan was paralysed by a constitutional crisis in the autumn of 1997, which started with a dispute between the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and the Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah. The Prime Minister refused to appoint 5 Supreme Court judges on the recommendation of the Chief Justice, but eventually the Prime Minister was forced by the President and the military leadership to concede that the Chief Justice had the right to make the appointments, which were approved by the National Assembly. The power struggle was not resolved, however, because the Supreme Court began contempt of court proceedings against the Prime Minister over his handling of the row with the judiciary and because of his sharply critical remarks to the National Assembly about the behaviour of the Supreme Court. Sharif was ordered to appear before the Supreme Court with eleven other respondents who included MPs, three newspapers and the state TV network. Sharif duly appeared but made no apology to the Court. [6h], [6i] & [5e]

See also Judicial System: paragraphs 4.2.1 - 4.2.35.

3.26 The Supreme Court was also dealing with a petition to suspend one of Sharif's first pieces of legislation which took away the power of the president to dismiss the government and appoint the heads of the armed forces. The National Assembly also rushed through a law allowing Sharif to appeal if he were to be convicted of contempt. However the President refused to sign the bill, which initiated a row between the President and Prime Minister, whose Muslim League party threatened to impeach the President. [6j] & [5f]

3.27 Matters took a further twist when a PML mob swarmed into the Supreme Court building, demanding the dismissal of the Chief Justice, who himself had been the subject of a challenge in the Quetta Bench of the Supreme Court, which suspended his appointment as Chief Justice on the grounds that he had not been the most senior judge when he had been appointed in 1994. The Supreme Court overturned this ruling. The army stepped in to persuade both sides to accept a cooling off period. On 2 December 1997 the Chief Justice suspended the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, thus restoring the power of the president to dismiss the government. Within minutes another Supreme Court bench suspended the Chief Justice. Later that day President Leghari announced his resignation to avoid having to sign an order removing the Chief justice and appointing a new one. The Speaker of the Senate, Waseem Sajjad, became acting president and Ajmal Mian was appointed new Chief Justice. [6l] & [6m]

3.28 The Muslim League candidate, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, was elected president by a big majority of the combined electoral college of the Senate, national and provincial Assemblies, and he was sworn in on 1 January 1998. Tarar was a member of the Senate and a former Supreme Court judge. [6n]

3.29 The Awami National Party ended its alliance with the PML on 26 February 1998 by withdrawing its support from the federal and North West Frontier Province governments. [24b] On 10 April 1998, the majority of leaders of the PML (Junejo) merged with the PML (Nawaz). The united party is known as the PML. However, Hamid Chatta, parliamentary leader of the PML(J) was not party to this agreement and he continues to call his organization PML(J). [9]

3.30 In April 1998, Pakistan began the test-firing of a medium range-missile, following the production by India of a missile and the alleged storage of weapons near the Pakistani border, and "provocative overtures" from India's recently elected coalition government, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. [24d]

3.31 In early May 1998, the Islamic blasphemy law again provoked widespread controversy and violent demonstrations when a Roman Catholic bishop committed suicide outside a court in Sahiwal, Punjab, in protest at the death sentence that had earlier been imposed on a Christian accused of blasphemy. [1]

See also Blasphemy Law: paragraphs 4.2.24 - 4.2.27; and Bishop John Joseph: paragraphs 5.3.41 - 5.3.44.

3.32 Pakistan and India both conducted a series of nuclear tests, provoking almost universal condemnation: India detonated five on 11 and 13 May 1998; Pakistan responded with six on 28 and 30 May 1998. International economic sanctions were promptly imposed on both countries. [24e]

See also Economy: paragraphs 2.5 - 2.9.

3.33 Following numerous threats, the MQM resigned on 26 August 1998 from its 19-month alliance with the PML in the Sindh Provincial Assembly. The MQM accused Nawaz Sharif and his provincial government of failing to honour an agreement on which basis the alliance was originally formed. [6w]

3.34 Also in August 1998, Nawaz Sharif announced plans to create an Islamic state by way of the introduction of Sharia Law. [8f] Despite criticism from opposition parties and human rights groups, the 15th Amendment Bill won National Assembly approval on 9 October 1998. The Bill has yet to be passed by the Senate. [6z] Two days earlier, the Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat, had resigned, after suggesting that Pakistan set up a National Security Council at the apex of the country's political system. General Karamat, who was due to retire in January 1999, was immediately replaced by Lieutenant-General Pervaiz Musharraf. [6y]

See also Sharia Law: paragraphs 4.2.12 - 4.2.18.

3.35 The MQM rejoined its alliance with the PML in the Sindh on 24 October 1998 [26a] but subsequently withdrew again on 29 October. [24g] On 30 October, the Prime Minister dismissed the Sindh provincial government and imposed federal rule on the province in attempt to stop the political and ethnic violence in Karachi. The Prime Minister then announced on 20 November that military courts would be established to restore peace to Karachi. [24g]

See also Security: Sindh: paragraphs 4.3.5 - 4.3.8; and Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

3.36 On 3 January 1999, the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, escaped an assassination attempt when a bomb exploded on the road leading to his weekend retreat. Four people died in the blast; three others were injured. The Prime Minister and his political entourage had been due to travel just minutes before the blast, and security forces had been placed along the route. [28a]

3.37 The Supreme Court ruled on 17 February 1999 that the controversial special military courts set up in Karachi [in early December 1998] to combat violence were illegal. [26e] The Court ruled that all pending cases should be transferred to existing anti-terrorist courts, and drew up guidelines for the speedy conduct of terrorist cases. [24i] The courts were disbanded following the ruling. [26f]

3.38 On 21 February 1999, the Pakistani prime minister and the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, signed a declaration (the 'Lahore Declaration') and vowed to take steps to reduce "the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons". The prime ministers' summit meeting in Lahore was the first on Pakistani soil for ten years. [19c] However, on 11 April 1999, India test-fired a long-range version of its nuclear-capable Agni missile. Pakistan responded by test-firing its Ghauri-II long–range missile on 14 April 1999. [26g]

3.39 On 15 April 1999, Benazir Bhutto (in absentia) and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, were convicted of corruption. They were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and disqualified from holding public office for up to ten years. They were also fined US$8.6 million and the court ordered the confiscation of all of their property. [24j] Zardari appealed to the Supreme Court on 10 May 1999. [24k] The Supreme Court said on 27 May 1999 that Benazir’s presence in Pakistan was not necessary, allowing her lawyers to appeal. [26h]

See also Accountability Commission: paragraphs 4.2.33 – 4.2.36.

3.40 In early May 1999, independent observers claimed that a large number of armed fighters moved from Pakistan into the high altitude passes on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. On 26 May 1999, India launched two waves of air-strikes in Kashmir to dislodge the 400 reportedly Pakistani-backed Muslim guerrillas (who, because of their commanding position, were in a position to cut off the vital Srinagar-Kargil Leh highway). [30] Following two months of bitter hostilities, Pakistan and India agreed on 11 July 1999 a plan for the infiltrators to withdraw. The agreement came one week after Nawaz Sharif met with the Us president, Bill Clinton, in Washington. [26j]

See also Azad Kashmir: paragraphs 5.4.16 – 5.4.31.

4.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM

4.1.1 The Constitution was promulgated on 10 April 1973, and has been amended on a number of subsequent occasions. [1] The Constitution incorporates the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam. The Constitution guarantees fundamental rights such as equal status for men and women; freedom of thought, speech, worship and the press, and freedom of assembly and association, as well as the rights of religious and other minorities. Institutionally, it provides for a federal democratic structure. [20] Several provisions of the Constitution were suspended following the imposition of martial law in 1977. The (amended) Constitution was restored on 30 December 1985. [1]

4.1.2 Pakistan is an Islamic republic with a democratic political system. A popularly-elected parliament, and a government headed by a prime minister, have wide constitutional power, shared to a limited extent with the president and, informally, the chief of the army staff who wields considerable influence on many major policy decisions. [2]

4.1.3 The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) government came into power in February 1997 with a massive parliamentary majority. The prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, then passed constitutional amendments (the 13th and 14th) which removed the power of the President to dismiss the government at his discretion and banned defections from political parties, two of the most frequently used methods of bringing down previous governments. These measures, which enjoyed opposition support, were aimed at enhancing political stability at the national level. As a result, the Government has greater power than any of its predecessors since the return of formal democracy in 1988. The Government's power was further enhanced by a 1997 constitutional confrontation between the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over the selection of five new justices for the Court. [2]

See also Judicial System: paragraphs 4.2.1 - 4.2.35.

4.1.4 Each of the four provinces has a Governor, appointed by the president. Each province has a provincial legislature consisting of the Governor and the Provincial Assembly. The Chief Minister of each provincial government is elected by the provincial assemblies and appoints Ministers to the provincial cabinets. [1] Azad Kashmir is broadly responsible for its own internal administration. [9]

See also Azad Kashmir: paragraphs 5.4.16 - 5.4.31.

4.1.5 Political parties have been allowed to operate freely since the full lifting of martial law in 1988. Unregistered political parties are permitted to participate in elections. Citizens have the right and the ability to change their government peacefully. [2]

4.1.6 The president is Head of State, and acts on the advice of the prime minister. He is elected by an electoral college, comprising two chambers of the Federal Legislature and the four Provisional Assemblies, to serve for a term of five years. He must be a Muslim. The president may be impeached for violating the Constitution or gross misconduct. The current president, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, took office on 1 January 1998. [1]

4.1.7 The Federal Legislature consists of the president, a lower and an upper house. The lower house, called the National Assembly, has 207 members elected directly for a term of five years, on the basis of universal suffrage (for adults over the age of 21 years), plus ten members representing minorities: [1] four seats for Christians, four seats for Hindus, one seat for Ahmadis, and one seat for Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis. [11]

See also Religious Minorities: Voting Rights: paragraphs 5.3.6 - 5.3.9.

4.1.8 The upper house, called the Senate, has 87 members who serve for six years, with one-third retiring every two years. Each Provincial Assembly is to elect nineteen senators. The tribal areas are to return eight and the remaining three are to be elected from the Federal Capital Territory by members of the Provincial Assemblies. [1]

4.1.9 The state of the parties in the National Assembly after the election of 3 February 1997 is as follows:

Polling was deferred in 3 constituencies until a later date. [1]

4.1.10 The PML also won a large majority in the Punjab Provincial Assembly elections. Following the elections, the PML went into coalition in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) with its long term electoral ally, the Awami National Party (ANP), and in the Sindh with the MQM. The PML joined a multi-party coalition government in Baluchistan during late 1997. [14b] However, the ANP withdrew its support from the federal and NWFP governments on 26[ February 1998. [24b] On 26 August 1998, the MQM resigned from their alliance with the PML in the Sindh, [6w] then rejoined on 24 October 1998 [26a] but quit again on 29 October 1998. [24g]

4.1.11 The results of the previous elections to the National Assembly held on 6 and 9 October 1993 were as follows:

4.2 JUDICIAL SYSTEM

4.2.1 The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, however, in practice, the judiciary is subject to political influence. Although the higher level judiciary is considered competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports of corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries. Low salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads and corruption contribute to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts. [2]

4.2.2 During the course of 1997, the judiciary vigorously asserted its authority in disputes with the executive branch, but was outmanoeuvred by the Prime Minister. Executive power was enhanced in 1997 by a constitutional confrontation between the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice over the selection of Supreme Court justices. As a result of this struggle, President Farooq Leghari resigned in December 1997, and the Prime Minister's own candidate, former judge Rafiq Tarar, was selected for the presidency by the National Assembly. Also, a Supreme Court panel deprived the Chief Justice of his position and a new Chief Justice was sworn in. Many observers fear that these events damaged the prestige and independence of the judiciary. [2]

4.2.3 Despite these concerns, there were several instances in 1998 in which the Supreme Court showed a continued degree of independence, striking down draconian laws favoured by the Government, including limits on freedom of speech, elements of a controversial anti-terrorism law, and some restrictions on fundamental liberties imposed by the state of emergency declared in the wake of Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998. The Supreme Court's decisions in these cases restored the faith of many in the independence of the judiciary. [2]

4.2.4 The judicial system involves several different court systems with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and criminal systems with special courts for banking, anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat appeals courts for certain Hudood offences. The Hudood ordinances crimalize non-marital rape, extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), various gambling, alcohol and property offences. The appeals process in the civil system is civil court, district court, High Court and the Supreme Court. In the criminal system, the progression is magistrate, sessions court, High Court and the Supreme Court. [2]

See also Special Courts: paragraph 4.2.7; and Anti-Terrorism Act: paragraphs 4.2.8 - 4.2.11.

4.2.5 The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital cases. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited number of judges, the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases routinely take years, although defendants are required to make frequent court appearances. [2]

4.2.6 Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and non-bailable offences. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused in bailable offences must be granted bail. The Code also stipulates that those accused in non-bailable offences should be granted bail if the crime of which they are accused carries a sentence of less than ten years. Many accused, especially well-connected individuals who are made aware of impending warrants against them, are also able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and are thus spared both arrest and incarceration. [2]

4.2.7 Special anti-terrorist courts began operation in Punjab in August 1997, and were virtually shut down by decisions of the Lahore High Court in March 1998 and the Supreme Court in May 1998. Subject to appeal, these decisions allowed previous convictions of the courts to stand and the courts continued to convict a few prisoners without recourse to disputed provisions. In October 1998, the Government amended the law pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court. The anti-terrorist courts, designed for the speedy punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures, but due to continued terrorist intimidation of witnesses, police and judges, produced only a handful of convictions of terrorist suspects before their operation was effectively suspended by the March Lahore High Court decision. [2]

See also Anti-Terrorism Act: paragraphs 4.2.8 - 4.2.11; and Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

4.2.8 The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) passed in 1997 allows confessions obtained while in police custody to be used to convict defendants in the new "special courts". Human rights organizations and the press criticized this provision of the law, as it is commonly believed that the police regularly torture suspects. Police generally did not attempt to use confessions to secure convictions under this law and the Government agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court invalidated this and other sections of the ATA. [2]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6; and Torture: paragraphs 5.2.9 - 5.2.11.

4.2.9 Amnesty International reported that at the end of 1997 several petitions were pending in the Supreme Court and the four High Courts, challenging the constitutionality of the new courts. Existing Special Courts for the Suppression of Terrorists Activities were closed in Sindh and Punjab provinces and thousands of pending cases were transferred to the new courts. [4e]

4.2.10 In May 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the government to amend the ATA to bring it into conformity with constitutionally guaranteed protection by granting higher courts the power to hear appeals from the anti-terrorism courts and by eliminating provisions granting police special powers to search private residences, obtain confessions by duress, and shoot without first being fired upon. [21b]

See also Special Courts: paragraph 4.2.7.

4.2.11 Prior to the substantive suspension of the Supreme Court in May 1998, the ATA allowed police, or military personnel acting as police, to enter and to search homes and offices without search warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in a terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision was never tested in the courts. By prior law, the police had to obtain a warrant to search a house, but they did not need a warrant to search a person. [2]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

4.2.12 The Constitution of Pakistan requires all laws to be consistent with Islam. Islamic law, or Sharia, is derived from the Koran (the holy book of Islam) and the Sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Mohammed). [3]

4.2.13 The Federal Sharia Court may overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. They also act as appeals courts for cases relating to the enforcement of the Hadood Ordinances. The cases referred are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and civilian judges who usually employ ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and lawyers must be Muslims and be familiar with Islamic law. Defendants in the Sharia courts are entitled to bail and lawyers of their choice. [3]

4.2.14 In August 1998, Nawaz Sharif declared his intention to fulfil his 1997 electoral pledge to make Pakistan a modern Islamic welfare state and amend the Constitution to declare the Koran and Sunnah to be the supreme law of the country. He said that the Koran required the government to establish systems of prayers; the payment of Islamic tax; and the eradication of evils from society. He stressed that it had been categorically enshrined in the draft constitutional amendment bill that personal laws, religious freedom, traditions and customs of non-Muslims will not be affected in any way, and that the status they enjoy as Pakistani citizens will not be affected in any way. [8f]

4.2.15 The most controversial clause of the bill, which would have made future constitutional amendments passable by a simple majority of voting members of a chamber rather than two-thirds of total membership, was dropped. Also dropped was the clause that would have made it mandatory for all state functions to comply with government directives for the enforcement of the Sharia. This alleviated previous criticism from the Prime Minister's own party, and, despite criticism from opposition parties and human rights groups, the bill (the '15th Amendment') was passed by the National Assembly on 9 October 1998.

4.2.16 The Government denied that the proposed legislation would fan religious intolerance, sectarianism and fundamentalism. The Government said that Sharif's party was not Islamist, and denied that the Bill would enhance the Prime Minister's authority. However, the Bill must be passed by the Senate [6z] (upper house) where a two-thirds majority of its 87 members is needed to make it law. The Christian Liberation Front claim to have received 40 letters from members of the Senate opposing the bill. [26b] As of the end of 1998, the bill had not yet been voted on in the Senate. [2]

See also Religious Minorities: Introduction: paragraphs 5.3.1 - 5.3.5.

4.2.17 The Government has also made formal the teaching of the Koran throughout its education system for the first time. Deep study of the Koran was confined to religious schools. Until now students have had to learn only a few verses of the Koran in school but the new policy will make it compulsory for them to be study all 30 chapters. The Prime Minister has declared his intentions to transform the education system and bring it in line with Islamic ways. [6p]

See also Religious Minorities: paragraphs 5.3.1 - 5.3.59; and Children: paragraphs 5.3.101 - 5.3.106.

4.2.18 According to a report on Pakistan Radio on 16 January 1999, the 'Shari'ah Nizam-i-Adal' (Islamic System of Justice) Regulation and Ordinance 1999 was promulgated for making Islamic law the supreme law in Malakand Division and Kohistan District of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The NWFP Chief Minister said that Islamic law would now have the highest position in these areas, and that no other laws would supersede them. He said that cases of personal law affecting non-Muslims would be settled according to their relevant religious laws. The Chief Minister also said that be enforcing Islamic law in these areas, the time was not far away when Islamic law would be enforced throughout the country. [8h]

4.2.19 The Pakistan Penal Code mandates the death penalty for anyone defiling the name of the Prophet Mohammed; life imprisonment for desecrating the Koran; and up to ten years' imprisonment for insulting another's religious beliefs (i.e. any religion, not just Islam) with intent to outrage religious feeling. [2]

See also Death Penalty: paragraphs 4.2.28 – 4.2.32.

4.2.20 The Hadood Ordinances, promulgated by the Government in 1979, and which came into effect in 1980, were an attempt to make the Penal Code more Islamic. These laws are applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Ordinances bring together five Islamic laws applying to:

• theft (Offences Against Property Ordinance);
• prohibition of alcohol and narcotics (Prohibition Order);
• zina, i.e. to rape, abduction adultery and fornication (Offence of Zina Ordinance);
• qazf, i.e. false accusation of zina (Offence of Qazf Ordinance); and
• the type of flogging inflicted for infractions of any of these laws (Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance).

See also Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34.

4.2.21 Offences are distinguished according to punishment, with some offences liable to Hadd (Koranic punishment) and others to Tazir (non-Koranic punishment). Punishment is usually imprisonment, but it can include flogging or other punishments which are considered to violate international human rights standards. Hadd punishments require a high standard of evidence. In effect, four adult male Muslims of good character must witness an act for a Hadd punishment to apply. In nineteen years, not a single Hadd punishment has been carried out. Ordinary punishments such as jail terms or fines may be imposed on the basis of lesser evidence. [3], [6] & [12c]

4.2.22 The Penal Code incorporates the doctrine of Qisas (roughly, "an eye for an eye") and Diyat ("blood money"). [2] The Qisas and Diyat Ordinance was promulgated after a 1990 Federal Sharia Court ruling. [3] Qisas is not known to have been invoked, but Diyat is used, with the result that compensation is sometimes paid to the family of a victim in place of punishment of the wrongdoer. Under these ordinances only the family of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. [2]

4.2.23 The Hadood, and Qisas and Diyat Ordinances apply to both ordinary criminal courts and Sharia courts. They also apply to non-Muslims. It is claimed that the laws perpetuate gender based violence against women. A woman who reports a case of rape to the police can find herself charged with adultery as all extra-marital sexual relations, whether consensual or not, are considered to be adultery and a violation of the Hadood Ordinances. [3], [6] & [12c]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6; and Women: paragraphs 5.3.83 - 5.3.100.

4.2.24 Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code, originally stipulated a maximum two-year sentence for insulting the religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to ten years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a sentence of life imprisonment for "whoever wilfully defiles, damages, or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran". In 1986 another amendment, Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for directly or indirectly defiling "the sacred name of the holy Prophet Mohammed". [2] In October 1990, the Federal Sharia Court ruled that the penalty for defiling the name of the Prophet Mohammed would be "death and nothing else". [20] In 1991 a court struck down the option of life imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by rivals and authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate Ahmadis, Christians and even orthodox Muslims. [2]

4.2.25 According to Amnesty International, the Blasphemy Law has been used over the years to harass, intimidate and punish mostly members of religious minorities, such as Ahmadis and Christians, as well as Muslims who advocate novel ideas. Ahmadis can be charged under this law for calling themselves Muslims; Christians complain that the legislation is abused and lays them open to false charges aimed at extortion or stealing land. There have been calls for the abolition of section 295(c) of the Penal Code. [20]

See also Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34; and Christians: paragraphs 5.3.35 - 5.3.52.

4.2.26 On 9 September 1998 Ghulam Akbar, a Shia Muslim, became the first Muslim to be sentenced to death under the blasphemy law. He had been charged with making derogatory remarks against the Prophet Mohammed. [24f] No one has been executed by the State under any of the blasphemy provisions, although religious extremists have killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996 magistrates have been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy to see whether they are credible before filing formal charges. [2]

4.2.27 It was reported on Radio Pakistan in December 1998 that, according to the Minister for Religious Affairs and Minorities Affairs, the Prime Minister had constituted a cabinet subcommittee, headed by the Minister for Religious Affairs and Minorities Affairs, to prevent misuse of the blasphemy law. Speaking at a function jointly organized by Masihi-Muslim Rabta (Christian-Muslim Co-ordination) and the Commission and Journalists Information Bureau in Rawalpindi, the Minister said that the committee, in consultation with provincial governments and other ministries, would suggest legal and administrative measures to prevent misuse of the blasphemy law and submit its recommendations to the Prime Minister. [8g]

4.2.28 Pakistan has one of the largest death cell populations in the world: in mid-1997 2,855 people were under sentence of death. In that year, thirteen people were reportedly executed, including a young man who was only fourteen years old at the time of the alleged offence. [4f] In 1998 some 433 people were sentenced to death and 21 were executed. The annual report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reportedly stated that of the 3,480 children currently in prison, 49 children were under the sentence of death. [4l]

4.2.29 The Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 and other statues awarding punishments for criminal offences apply generally to everyone, including children, in all the four provinces of Pakistan, except in the designated tribal areas. Under the Pakistan Penal Code, "nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion". The qualification of attainment of maturity implies that a child considered by a judge sufficiently mature at the time of committing the offence will be dealt with by the law as an adult. However, no guidelines are provided for a judge to establish maturity. According to Amnesty International, any suspect above the age of twelve, or between the ages of seven and twelve if they have attained "sufficient maturity of understanding" can be tried, convicted and sentenced to all the relevant punishments provided by law, including the death penalty. [4k]

4.2.30 Despite the fact that in the Sindh province children under the age of sixteen at the time if initiation may not be sentenced to death, children under that ago were reportedly sentenced to death in the Sindh. The Punjab Youthful Offenders Ordinance 1983, which was brought into operation only in the district of Sahiwal in 1993, but not in other parts of Punjab, bans the death penalty and life imprisonment for any offender below the age of fifteen at the time of the offence. The special laws relating to child protection in Sindh and Punjab override federal laws; there are no special laws protecting children in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province, nor the tribal areas. [4l]

4.2.31 The Penal Code includes provisions for imposing the death penalty for numerous offences such as:

• murder (section 302)
• murder in the course of a robbery (section 17(4))
• offences against property (Hudood Ordinances)
• waging war or abetting the waging of war against the State (section 121)
• abetting mutiny (section 13)
• kidnapping for ransom (section 364)
• kidnapping a person under the age of ten with intent to murder or causing grievous bodily harm section 364(a))
• robbery (section 396)
• hijacking (section 402(b) and harbouring a hijacker (section 402(c))
• zina and rape (Hudood Ordinances)
• blasphemy (section 295(c))

4.2.32 In September 1996, the death penalty was extended to drug trafficking; planning to or sabotaging the railway system; and arms trading. It was further extended to gang rape in March 1997. [20]

See also Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34; Christians: paragraphs 5.3.35 - 5.3.52; Women: paragraphs 5.3.83 - 5.3.100; and Children: paragraphs 5.3.101 – 5.3.106.

4.2.33 The National Assembly passed the Accountability (Ehtesab) Bill on 29 May 1997. This applies to those who held public office since 6 November 1990 and provides a mechanism for trial of public officials accused of corrupt practices through an independent office of the Chief Accountability Commissioner. [8c] The Government has used the "accountability" process - which supposedly was designed to expose previous wrongdoing, recoup ill-gotten gains, and restore public confidence in government institutions - for political purposes by harassing and arresting a number of prominent politicians and bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party. Few of those arrested and questioned have been put on trial. [2]

4.2.34 The Accountability Commission established by the 1996-97 caretaker government has been overshadowed by an "accountability cell" headed by a close associate of the Prime Minister, Senator Saifur Rehman. This cell, ostensibly initiated to uncover corruption in an even-handed manner, has conducted politically driven investigations of, and campaigns of vilification against, opposition politicians, senior civil servants, and business figures. These investigations are designed to extract evidence and in some cases, televised confessions of alleged wrongdoers. Authorities arrested and questioned the wife and daughter of former Pakistan Steel executive Usman Farooqi in an attempt to pressure the already-imprisoned Farooqi. In an effort to compel a former bureaucrat to return to Pakistan, the Government prevented the departure of family members, even those who were not citizens of Pakistan, on the grounds that they were "beneficiaries" of alleged corruption. In late July 1998, the Lahore High Court ruled that this approach was invalid. [2]

4.2.35 On 1 January 1998 the Government filed twelve corruption cases with the Accountability Commission against Benazir Bhutto, her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and her mother, Nusrat Bhutto. The investigation was widened when it was announced that the UK government had agreed to assist in the seizure of documents (held in the UK) pertaining to Zardari's assets and bank accounts. [24a] Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari were both formally charged in October 1998 under the Ehtesab laws with corruption. Both have pleaded not guilty, Benazir claiming that the case is politically motivated and against her family alone. [6x]

4.2.36 Benazir was convicted in absentia of corruption on 15 April 1999. She was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and disqualified from holding public office for up to ten years. Zardari was also convicted and received the same sentence. They were also fined US$8.6 million and the court ordered the confiscation of all of their property. Benazir, who was in London at the time of the verdict, flew to Dubai on 28 April 1999, with the professed intention of consulting her lawyers to prepare an appeal. [24j] Zardari appealed to the Supreme Court on 10 May 1999. The Supreme Court ruled on 13 May 1999 that it would not hear an appeal by Benazir against her conviction until she returned to Pakistan. [24k] However, the Supreme Court said on 27 May 1999 that Benazir’s presence in Pakistan was not necessary, allowing her lawyers to appeal. [26h]

4.3 SECURITY

4.3.1 Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and Frontier Constabulary, provide additional support in areas where law and order problems are especially acute, such as Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments control the police and paramilitary forces when they are assisting in law and order operations. The regular army is also occasionally deployed to assist in maintaining public order in sensitive areas during certain religious holidays. [2]

4.3.2 There are two levels within the Pakistan police force: one under federal jurisdiction, the Federal Investigation Agency, and the other under provincial jurisdiction. Each province has its own police force under the authority of an inspector general named by the provincial government. Police stations are organised by district and are placed under the supervision of a district superintendent and his assistants who are also named by the provincial government. In large cities, the police force is part of a municipal structure, also under the authority of the provincial inspector general. [12c]

4.3.3 In accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, all information regarding a crime and especially the date of the deposition, must be recorded in a preliminary report (First Information Report or FIR) by the chief of police at the station where the crime was reported. The 24-hour period between the arrest and the suspect's appearance before a judge is determined from the time of the deposition recorded in the preliminary report, and, in the absence of this report, the accused may be detained indefinitely without the court being informed. [12c]

See also Arbitrary Arrest: paragraphs 5.2.7 - 5.2.8.

4.3.4 It was reported in 1998 that members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses. In Karachi, killings between rival political factions often were carried out with the assistance of criminal gangs. However, many such killings were also believed to have been committed by or with the participation of security forces. The MQM-Altaf accused security forces of killing and torturing scores of its workers. Overall, police and security forces remained free from legal and judicial restraint in Sindh. [2]

See also Sindh: paragraphs 4.3.5 - 4.3.8; and Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

4.3.5 Since the late 1980s Pakistan has been faced with a situation of increasing violence which has been generated by a combination of criminal/terrorist activities, ethnic tensions, political rivalries, and the misuse of police powers. The southern province of Sindh has been particularly affected. There the violence has been related to the conflict between factions of the MQM. Both parties are well armed and their political rivalry turned into gun battles. In the early 1990s there was strong rivalry between the PPP and the MQM. Benazir Bhutto accused a militant wing of the MQM of being responsible for hundreds of politically motivated killings of PPP members. Between mid-1992 and late 1994 the army assisted the police in restoring law and order in Sindh. [3] & [4a]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

4.3.6 Amnesty International reported that in 1995 killings, abductions and "disappearances" occurred in the context of the struggle between the two MQM factions and the Government's campaign to restore law and order. Fighting between Shias and Sunni political groups also led to arbitrary and deliberate killings. [4a]

See also Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

4.3.7 It was estimated that about 2,000 were killed in 1995, and 500 in 1996 in ethnic, political and sectarian violence in Karachi. The levels of violence fell in 1997 but clashes between the MQM and MQM (Haqiqi) continued. The MQM deny any responsibility for the violence and accuses the MQM (Haqiqi) of obstructing its workers and elected representatives. The Haqiqi faction accuse the police of cracking down on its workers since the MQM joined the provincial government after the February 1997 elections. The Karachi police chief stated that all the political groups have weapons and that the police were determined to seize all illegal weapons, regardless of the party. [6f] & [6i]

4.3.8 On 30 October 1998, the Prime Minister dismissed the Sindh provincial government and imposed federal rule in an attempt to stop the political and ethnic violence in Karachi. On 20 November, the Prime Minister announced that military courts would be established to restore peace to Karachi. [24g] However, the Supreme Court ruled on 17 February 1999 that the controversial special military courts were illegal. [26e] The Court ruled that all pending cases should be transferred to existing anti-terrorist courts, and drew up guidelines for the speedy conduct of terrorist cases. [24i] The courts were disbanded following the ruling, however, the Prime Minister vowed not to stop his war against terrorism. Political, ethnic and sectarian violence had taken more than 800 hundred lives in Karachi in 1998. [26f]

See also Muttahida Qaumi Movement: paragraphs 5.3.60 - 5.3.82.

4.3.9 The province of Punjab has also been affected by sectarian violence. Armed militants have been active in all of Punjab's towns with large numbers of deaths as a result of clashes between Sunni and Shia extremist groups. In response the Punjab Government decided to set up Suppression of Terrorism Activities Courts to deal with cases of terrorism and sectarian violence. The police were instructed to finalise the chalans (prosecution process) of terrorists and sectarian cases within seven days so that such cases could be tried in the courts of competent jurisdiction. The Government also decided to set up a Rapid Deployment Force to combat effectively terrorist activity. [5a], [8a] & [8b]

See also Anti-Terrorism Act: paragraphs 4.2.8 - 4.2.11; Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6; and Shia Muslims: paragraphs: 5.3.53 -5.3.59.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 Although the human rights situation has reportedly improved substantially since the death of Zia ul-Haq, a culture of violence and criminality is said to prevail in Pakistan. The US State Department reported that in 1997 Pakistan's human rights record remained poor, with serious problems of police abuse, religious discrimination and child labour. Police reportedly committed extra-judicial killings, tortured, raped, abused, and arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. [20]

See also Arbitrary Arrest: paragraphs 5.2.7 - 5.28.

5.1.2 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that human rights abuses rose in 1997. Sectarian conflict was notably at its most violent for years, with some 200 people being killed, mostly in the central province of Punjab. [6q] Human Rights Watch commented that the sectarian violence, and the government's harsh response to it, left little scope for improvement in human rights. [20] The same source reported that human rights were absent from the Government's agenda in 1998. [21b]

5.1.3 The US State Department also reported that the Government's human rights record remained poor in 1998, with serious problems in several areas. Despite attempts to reform and to professionalize the police, police committed numerous extra-judicial killings and tortured, abused and raped citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were transferred or suspended for their actions, there is no evidence that any police officers were brought to justice. In general, police continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison conditions remained poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. [2]

See also Security: paragraphs: 4.3.1 - 4.3.9; Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6; Arbitrary Arrest: paragraphs 5.2.7 - 5.2.8; Religious Minorities: paragraphs 5.3.1 - 5.3.59; Women: paragraphs 5.3.83 - 5.3.100; and Children: paragraphs 5.3.101 - 5.3.106.

5.2 GENERAL ASSESSMENT

5.2.1 The United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Torture visited Pakistan in early 1996. His report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights covered a number of areas of concern: unlawful detention by the security forces; torture, including rape, and ill treatment to elicit confessions and to compel detainees to incriminate others; denial of medical treatment to detainees; and use of fetters and corporal punishment. The Special Rapporteur referred to positive steps such as the creation of the Ministry of Human Rights, but concluded that there was no political will to address the issue of impunity and saw no serious effort on the part of the Government then in office to reform the police or judicial systems or to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses. [7a]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

5.2.2 The Special Rapporteur further reported in 1997 that he had received information indicating that the death sentence may be imposed in trials which are alleged not to meet minimum fair trial standards as laid down in international instruments. Death sentences imposed in trials before the Special Courts for the Suppression of Terrorist Activities fall short of international standards for fair trial in so far as these trials do not proceed from the presumption of innocence. [7c]

5.2.3 According to the 1998 US State Department report, the extra-judicial killing of criminal suspects, often in the form of deaths in police custody or staged encounters in which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. In Punjab, a police crackdown on notorious criminals resulted in scores of extra-judicial killings, especially in staged encounters around Lahore. Public criticism of these killings was muted, since crime dropped noticeably. In contrast to previous years, the police exhibited greater selectivity in choosing their victims, focusing on those widely believed to be violent criminals. During 1998, 143 persons were killed in 72 encounters. Suspected criminals were killed by the police to prevent them from implicating police in crimes during court proceedings. Police officials maintain in private that due to the lack of concrete evidence, witness intimidation, corruption in and threats against the judiciary, and sometimes political pressure, courts often fail to punish criminals involved in serious crimes. [2]

5.2.4 Police professionalism is low. The police view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate in light of the lack of effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary, on the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not stand up in court. Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended for their involvement in extra-judicial killings. However, court-ordered inquiries into these killings so far have failed to result in any police officer receiving criminal punishment. In general, police commit such killings with impunity. [2] Amnesty International reported in their 1999 Annual Report that the police did not apparently take any protective measures when religious groups in September and October 1998 issued fatwas offering rewards for anyone killing human rights activists, journalists and religious personalities, including the head of the Ahmadiyya community. [4j]

5.2.5 In 1997 Punjab province Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared that his own police were "corrupt and inefficient". He appointed new senior officials to improve effectiveness, while resisting pressure to appoint those recommended by influential supporters to police positions. In an attempt to increase police professionalism, a Punjab elite police training academy was established in November 1997 and began training hundreds of constables. [2] Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women, including rape. These police stations are staffed by female personnel, but receive even less material and human resources than regular police stations, according to human rights advocates. [2]

5.2.6 Human rights groups and lawyers in Pakistan have reportedly accused the government of executing hundreds of suspected criminals in fake shootouts carried out by the police. They describe the killings, reported in the local press as "police encounters", as a deliberate government policy. It has also been reported that one of the Punjab top police officials has admitted that at least 50% of police shoot-outs were faked. The Government, however, denies such a policy. Lawyers, human rights activists and doctors in the Punjab have launched an independent investigation. [28f]

See also Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34; Christians: paragraphs 5.3.35 - 5.3.52; and Women: paragraphs 5.3.83 - 5.3.100.

5.2.7 The law regulates arrest and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply with the law, and the police arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. The law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public Order Act have been imprisoned for up to six months without charge. For other criminal offences, the police may hold a suspect for 24-hours without charge. After the prisoner is produced before a magistrate, the court can grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period of fourteen days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary for an investigation. [2]

5.2.8 Police are empowered to arrest individuals on the basis of a First Information Report (FIR) filed by a complainant, but they are said to be frequently filed without supporting evidence and used to harass or intimidate individuals. Individuals are sometimes detained arbitrarily without charges, or on false charges, in order to extort payment for their release. [20]

See also Security: paragraphs 4.3.1 - 4.3.9; and Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

5.2.9 Although expressly forbidden by the Constitution and the Penal Code, torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by the police remained common. Police routinely use force to elicit confessions. While no figures are available on reports of torture by security forces, there were fewer reports of torture in the press in 1998. Human rights observers suggest that because of the widespread use of physical torture by the police, suspects usually confess to crimes regardless of their guilt or innocence; the courts subsequently throw out many such confessions. [2]

5.2.10 Common methods of torture include: beating, burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of feet, sexual assault, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, forced spreading of the legs and public humiliation. Some magistrates reportedly help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports stating that the victims died of natural causes. [2]

5.2.11 Due to greater scrutiny by non-governmental organizations and the media, as well as a program of prison inspections in the Punjab, torture and abuse may be less common in prisons than it is in police stations. [2] Amnesty International reported that torture, including rape, in police custody and jails remained widespread in 1998, resulting in at least 50 deaths. Amnesty also reported that children were particularly at risk of torture and ill-treatment. [4j] Amnesty estimate that at least 100 persons die from police torture each year. [2] Few police officers said to be responsible for inflicting torture and death to detainees are brought to justice, instead being subjected to administrative disciplinary measures. [20]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6; and Children: paragraphs 5.3.101 – 5.3.106.

5.2.12 National elections for national and provincial assemblies were held in February 1997. Election observers, including teams from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and groups representing the European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, concluded that the elections were generally "free and fair" with no evidence of systemic or widespread abuse of the electoral process. [2]

5.2.13 There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups are generally free to operate without government restriction. The Government has provided protection to human rights lawyers defending accused blasphemers following threats and attacks on the lawyers by religious extremists. [2] Throughout 1998, Pakistan's human rights movement remained active on a range of issues including protests against the country's nuclear tests [in May of that year]. [21b]

5.2.14 The provisional government of the Punjab announced in May 1999 that almost 2,000 non-government organizations had been "dissolved" and that a second wave of some 30,000 organizations were under threat. Following a meeting of the NGO forum on 14 may 1999, a senior official said that any NGOs found to have indulged in "anti-state" or "anti-Islamic" activities would be shut down. In its defence the Punjab provincial government reported that it was simply weeding out corrupt and inactive NGOs. Thousands of NGOs in Pakistan reportedly exist only on paper and were set up to purely embezzle donor funds. However, there is much concern that the clean-up will be used to sweep away organizations disliked by the government because of their opposition to nuclear testing and the introduction of Sharia law. Women’s groups, human rights activists and other bodies across Pakistan have pledged to resist closure moves, and have planned demonstrations and rallies, and an appeal to the courts. [28d]

5.3 SPECIFIC GROUPS

5.3.1 The Constitution of Pakistan guarantees the rights of religious minorities. Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which 96% of the population is Muslim. While the majority belong to the Sunni sect, some 20 - 25% of the population is Shia. [2] The remainder are mainly Hindus or Christians. The Constitution requires that laws are consistent with Islam [3] and imposes some elements of Koranic law on both Muslims and religious minorities. There are also restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims. [2]

5.3.2 Amnesty International reported that in 1997 places of worship were indiscriminately attacked by members of religious groups. [4e] In that year, the Prime Minister spoke out in support of the rights of religious minorities, and hosted a Christmas dinner in 1997 for 1,200 persons. In September 1998, the Government removed colonial-era entries for "sect" from government job application forms to prevent discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. [2]

See also Christians: paragraphs 5.3.35 - 5.3.52.

5.3.3 While there is no law establishing the Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert from Islam), social pressure against such an action is so powerful that most such conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of reprisals against suspected converts are common. "Islamiyyat" (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in their own religion. In practice, many non-Muslim students are compelled by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat studies. The new education policy announced by the Government on 27 March 1998 included provisions for increased mandatory Islamic instruction in public schools. [2]

5.3.4 Minority religious groups fear that the constitutional imposition of Sharia law favoured by the Prime Minister in his proposed 15th amendment, and his goal of Islamizing government and society, may further restrict the freedom to practice non-Islamic religions. The Government counters that the proposed amendment contains specific language protecting the rights of minorities. Discriminatory religious legislation has encouraged an atmosphere of religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus and members of Muslim offshoot sects such as Ahmadis and Zikris. [2]

See also Sharia Law: paragraphs 4.2.12 - 4.2.18.

5.3.5 Pakistan has signed and ratified the following international instruments:

• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
• International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

5.3.6 The 1973 Constitution guarantees religious minorities the right to vote in general elections as full citizens in a joint electorate. The 1974 Constitutional amendment, which declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, led to a change in their voting status. Article 106(3) of the 1973 Constitution, which provided for the special representation of religious minorities, was amended to include Ahmadis. In 1978 two separate electorates - one for Muslims and one for religious minorities - were created for the National and Provincial Assemblies. [3]

5.3.7 The last five elections (1985, 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997) have been held under the separate electoral system. Under this system, the different religious groupings are compartmentalised: Muslims are allowed to vote only for Muslim candidates, and minorities for minority candidates. The minority groups are guaranteed a number of seats (Christians four; Hindus four; Ahmadis one; [27a] and other non-Muslims (Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis) one. [11]

5.3.8 Each of the four categories is maintained on a separate electoral roll, and minorities cannot cast votes for the Muslim constituency seats. Under Article 106 of the Constitution, seats in the provincial assemblies are reserved for minorities. Under this system, minorities vote for reserved at-large seats, not for non-minority candidates who represent actual constituencies. Because of this, local parliamentary representatives have little incentive to promote their minority constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that these "separate electorates" are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their followers not to register as "non-Muslims," so most Ahmadis are completely un-represented. [2] Ahmadis do not accept the official designation of themselves as non-Muslims and so refuse to take up the seats allocated to them in the National and Provincial elections. [3]

5.3.9 The 1997 general election report states that each Christian NA member represents 327,606 persons; each Hindu and scheduled castes NA member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi and other non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member 104,244. These figures significantly understate the population of most of the minority groups because they are based on 1981 census figures. The 1998 census figures for religious minorities have not yet been published. [2]

See also Federal Legislature: paragraphs 4.1.7 - 4.1.11; and Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34.

5.3.10 There are approximately 10 million Ahmadis world-wide, of whom some 4 million live in Pakistan. There are estimates which suggest that Ahmadis make up some 2.7% of Pakistan's population, though it is difficult to determine the actual size as Ahmadis generally declare themselves to be Muslims. [12d]

5.3.11 The Ahmadiyya, a religious sect which calls for the renewal of Islam, was founded in Punjab by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) in 1889. He announced that he was commanded by God to accept bai'at (homage or allegiance paid to a religious leader) and he claimed "under divine direction" that he was both the promised Mahdi (the rightly guided one) and the Promised Messiah in one person whose main function would be the renaissance of Islam. It was also revealed to him that he was the Prophet whose advent had been foretold in the principal religions of the world. [12a] & [12d]

See also Bai'at: paragraph 5.3.24.

5.3.12 The Koran describes Muhammad as the "seal of the prophets", and thus he is regarded as the last prophet. However Ghulam Ahmad interpreted this reference in the Koran as meaning that Mohammed was the last law-giving prophet, and he proclaimed himself to be a prophet without a scripture or book of his own, but with a mission to rejuvenate Islam. [12a] & [12d]

5.3.13 After Ghulam Ahmad's death in 1908, Nur al-Din was elected to succeed him, and after his death in 1914, Ghulam Ahmad's son, Mahmud Ahmad was elected. The leadership has since remained within the founder's family, with Tahir Ahmad, a grandson, elected as Khalifatul Masih IV (fourth Successor of the Messiah) in 1982. [12a] & [12d]

5.3.14 Quadian became part of India after the 1947 Partition. Mahmud Ahmad, together with most of the Ahmadi residents of Quadian moved first to Lahore in Pakistan, then to a purpose built city 95 miles to the west, called Rabwah. The plan of the city reflects Ahmadi religious beliefs. In addition to the two central mosques, each of the sixteen quarters has a mosque at its centre, in which according to Islamic tradition, all religious, social and cultural activities are held. [12a]

5.3.15 In 1974 the Constitution of Pakistan was amended to declare Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority group. This had the practical effect of allowing Ahmadis freedom to practise their religion among themselves as do other religious minorities such as Christians and Hindus, providing they did not represent themselves as Muslims. [3] & [13]

5.3.16 President Zia ul-Haq introduced the Hudood (Punishment) Ordinances in 1984, which "define crimes against Islam" and "enforce punishment for those who commit such crimes". In Hudood cases, the testimony of a non-Muslim is considered to be worth half that of a Muslim. [7c]

5.3.17 Article 260 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that: "A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophet-hood of Muhammad...is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law." [3] & [13] Ordinance XX was incorporated into the 1985 Constitution. On 28 April 1984 [7c] President Zia promulgated Ordinance XX, a law which provides for prison terms of up to three years and fines for Ahmadis who called themselves Muslims and who used Islamic terminology (inserted as sections 298(B) and 298(C) of the Pakistan Penal Code). [3] & [13] The constitutionality of this Section was upheld in a split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. [2]

5.3.18 In 1986 the Government inserted section 295(c) into the Penal Code which stated that the penalties for blaspheming the Prophet Mohammed were death or life imprisonment and a fine: "Use of derogatory remarks etc, in respect of the Holy Prophet...shall be punished with death, or imprisonment of life, and shall also be liable to fine." Section 295(c) was amended in August 1991 to make the death penalty the only punishment for blasphemy. Also in 1991 section 295(a) of the Penal Code was amended to increase the maximum punishment for outraging the religious feelings of any group from two to ten years. [3] & [12b]

5.3.19 Many Ahmadis have been charged and imprisoned under sections 298(b) & (c) and 295(c) and the laws have encouraged an atmosphere of religious sectarianism in which Ahmadis reportedly suffer intimidation, discrimination and harassment. [12b]

5.3.20 The enforcement of Ordinance XX has been uneven and in many cases has been the result of localised pressure being brought to bear on the police by fundamentalist Muslim clerics, particularly in rural areas, or personal bigotry on the part of the police. However, a number of Ahmadis occupy important positions in Pakistani society, particularly in business and the professions. While Ahmadis can be prosecuted for their normal daily behaviour, not every Ahmadi actually is prosecuted. Prosecution largely depends on whether a neighbour or colleague reports a violation of the law to the police. Hence the area where an Ahmadi lives and the circumstances in which they live can determine whether or not they are prosecuted. [3] & [13]

See also 1860 Pakistan Penal Code: paragraphs 4.2.19 - 4.2.31.

5.3.21 To obtain a passport Pakistanis must declare their religious adherence on the passport application form. If they declare themselves to be Muslim, they must sign the declaration for Muslims which states inter-ail, that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is an impostor and that his disciples are not Muslims. [12b]

5.3.22 There are conflicting reports about the consequences of this: an Ahmadi who signs the passport declaration may be charged with making a false statement by claiming to be a Muslim, and if an Ahmadi ticks the box for religious minorities, he may be ostracised by the Ahmadi community for declaring himself to be a non-Muslim. [12b]

5.3.23 However, most Ahmadis indicate that they are Muslims, and sign the passport declaration, because they do not want to draw attention to their Ahmadi faith and do not consider the passport declaration to be religiously binding. These Ahmadis are neither ostracised by the Ahmadi community nor charged with falsely declaring themselves to be Muslims. However, there is an alternative view that Ahmadis sign the passport declaration because they regard themselves as true Muslims. [3]

5.3.24 Bai'at is an oath of allegiance, a pledge, made by a person who is not an Ahmadi by birth to fulfil certain conditions and abide by the doctrines of Islam. A person born of Ahmadi parents is considered to be an Ahmadi by birth. That person is not required to go through bai'at - unless there has been a change in the Supreme Head of the community in which case all Ahmadis perform bai'at, thus renewing their allegiance to the new Head. Furthermore, there is no objection for an Ahmadi by birth to perform bai'at (however, s/he will not be issued with a Certificate of Bai'at). [18a]

See also Religious Minorities: Introduction: paragraphs 5.3.1 -5.3.5.

5.3.25 According to the 1998 US State Department report, Ahmadis continued to suffer from a variety of restrictions of religious freedom and widespread societal discrimination, including violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, speech and assembly, and restrictions on their press, in 1998. Several Ahmadi mosques remained closed. [2]

5.3.26 Ahmadis are often targets of religious intolerance, much of it instigated by organized religious extremists. Ahmadi leaders charge that militant Sunni mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual centre in central Punjab. Backed by mobs of 100 to 200 persons, the mullahs purportedly stride down the streets uttering diatribes against the Ahmadis and their founder, a situation that often leads to violence. Police are generally on hand during these marches, the Ahmadis claim, but as a rule do not intervene to prevent trouble. A number of Ahmadis were seriously injured in attacks by religious extremists, and Ahmadi leaders attribute several killings of Ahmadis during 1998 to anti-Ahmadi extremists. [2]

5.3.27 Ahmadis may have limited choices for advancement in the public sector and may find it difficult, if not impossible, to advance to high ranks in the army and public administration. [3] Even the rumour that someone may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for employment or promotion. [2] The 1980s saw more examples of Ahmadis being dismissed than in recent times. Also being an Ahmadi is sufficient reason to be excluded from an institution of higher education. [3] Ahmadi students are subject to abuse by their non-Ahmadi classmates, and the quality of teachers assigned to the schools by the government is poor. Young Ahmadis and their parents also complain of difficulty in gaining admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go abroad for higher education. [2] Ahmadi newspapers and magazines have been banned when their articles were considered offensive to the religious feelings of orthodox Muslims. [3]

5.3.28 Certain sections of the Penal Code have caused problems for Ahmadis, particularly the provision that forbids Ahmadis from "directly or indirectly" posing as Muslims. Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges against Ahmadis for using the standard Muslim greeting form and naming their children Mohammed. [2]

5.3.29 According to the Human Rights' Commission of Pakistan, the government's unofficial changes to the procedures for filing formal blasphemy charges made in 1995 have been followed by a significant drop in the number of charges. Since 1996 magistrates are required to investigate allegations of blasphemy to see whether they are credible before filing formal charges. [2] From 1986 to 1993, over 200 Ahmadis were charged with blasphemy but none were convicted. [7c] According to Amnesty International, in 1996 some 120 members of the Ahmadi community were charged with religious offences, including blasphemy. Ahmadis charged with blasphemy were often denied bail. [4b]

5.3.30 Amnesty reported that 32 members of the Ahmadi community were reportedly charged with religious offences in 1997. [4e] Three were convicted of blasphemy in December of that year; lawyers for the men have appealed the decision to the Lahore High Court, whose ruling had not been issued by the end of 1998. [2] Amnesty also reported that at least 106 members of the Ahmadiyya community were charged in 1998 with blasphemy under Section 295-C of the Penal Code. In April 1998, an Ahmadi doctor was reportedly sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by an anti-terrorism court. [4j] According to Ahmadi activists, 44 Ahmadis were charged with violating blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws during 1998. Ahmadi leaders state that 145 Ahmadis were awaiting trial on blasphemy charges under section 295(c), as of 30 September 1998. [2]

5.3.31 Mirza Ghulam Qadir, a nephew of the Supreme Head of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association, was murdered in Pakistan on 14 April 1999. Members of the Lashkar Jhangvi, the military wing of the Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan, reportedly fired at Mirza Ghulam Qadir after he tried to escape from being abducted. Three bystanders were also killed in the incident. The Police Elite Force later killed the four Lashkar Jhangvi members after the perpetrators took refuge in a school, where they had reportedly taken students and children hostage. The members who died were considered to be well-known terrorists and were wanted by the police. [18b]

5.3.32 Internal conflict began to surface during Nur al-Din's khalifat, but the final split occurred over the election of Mahmud Ahmad as Khalifatul Masih II, following Nur al-Din's death in 1914. Leading members of the movement, Muhammad Ali and Kamal ud-Din, left with their followers for Lahore where they established the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaate Islam (Ahmadiyya Association for the Propagation of Islam), with Muhammad Ali as its head. They have since become known as the Lahori Branch, and number only approximately 1,000 adherents, while the Ahmadis who follow Ghulam Ahmad's teachings are referred to as the Quadiani Branch, though they refer to themselves as Ahmadis. [12a] & [12d]

5.3.33 This major doctrinal split between the Lahoris and the Quadianis revolved around Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophet-hood. The Lahoris' belief in his prophet-hood was increasingly abandoned until his religious status was likened to that of a partial prophet and mujaddid, who had been sent in the fourteenth century of the Islamic calendar to renew Islam. By denying full prophet-hood to Ghulam Ahmad, Lahoris reject another Ahmadi injunction which stipulates that an Ahmadi is permitted to pray only under the leadership of Ahmadi Imams. [12a]

5.3.34 Unlike Quadianis, Lahoris do not prevent their women from marrying non-Ahmadi Muslims. However they follow Ghulam Ahmad's teaching about Jesus and his death in Kashmir. They further agree with the Quadianis that jihad should not be understood as a war-like, but as a spiritual struggle to establish the truth of Islam. They insist that no Muslim can be called kafir (infidel), thus rejecting Ghulam Ahmad's declaration that all non-Ahmadis are kafirs. [12a]

5.3.35 There are some 1.7 million Christians in Pakistan of various denominations. One category of Christians are the Goan migrants who are entirely Roman Catholic, live in and around Karachi, are generally well educated, fluent in English and are often members of the professions. The remainder are descendants of low caste Hindus who were converted by western Protestant missionaries. Among these are teachers and nurses and those who work in factories and service industries, but the majority are poorly educated and earn a meagre living. Christians are present in all main urban areas, but they are mainly concentrated in Punjab. [9] & [13]

5.3.36 The government does not interfere in the practice of Christian worship. Separate electorates and reserved parliamentary seats exist for religious minorities, including Christians. Proselytisation is forbidden under Pakistani law. Some Christians complain that they have been harassed by extremist Muslim groups who assert that proselytisation defames the Prophet Mohammed. [13]

See also Religious Minorities: Voting Rights: paragraphs 5.3.6 - 5.3.9.

5.3.37 In 1995 Salamat Masih, a fourteen-year old Christian boy, and his uncle, Rehmat Masih, were found guilty of scrawling blasphemous remarks on a mosque wall in Punjab two years earlier. They were shot and wounded while leaving the court during the trial, and a third accused, Manzoor Masih, was killed in the attack. They were sentenced to death. The sentences were later quashed by the Lahore High Court. Salamat and Rehmat left Pakistan and sought asylum in Germany. The Prime Minister, at the time, Benazir Bhutto, angered the country's Islamic fundamentalists when she said she was "shocked and saddened" by the death sentence but she later stated that blasphemy would remain a capital offence. [1], [3], [17] & [14a]

5.3.38 On 6 February 1997 in Khanewal and the nearby village of Shantinagar in Punjab, Muslim mobs burnt down twelve Christian churches, injured 50 people and destroyed more than 250 houses, 80 shops and a school after a rumour was broadcast on mosque loudspeakers that Christians had desecrated pages of the Koran. It was reported that the police were believed to have instigated the incident with the help of Islamic groups in retaliation for the suspension of several police officers who had been disciplined after desecrating the Bible during an earlier raid. Approximately 20,000 were rendered homeless. The Government took immediate relief action, deploying troops briefly to restore order and the Prime Minister visited the villages. [2], [12g] & [14c]

5.3.39 Later that month, on 13 February 1997, thousands of Christian demonstrators protesting in Karachi about the burning of the churches in Khanewal, clashed with the police and around 200 were detained. [12g] & [14c]

See also Police: paragraphs 5.2.3 - 5.2.6.

5.3.40 In August 1997 it was reported that the federal government had paid approximately US $735,000 for repairs to damaged churches and buildings in Khanewal and Shantinagar and for compensation to victims of the violence against Christians in the February 1997 disturbances. [12g] As of the end of 1998, the 86 persons who were charged with offences related to the attack remain free on bail and there was no indication that authorities planned to bring them to trial. [2]

5.3.41 On 6 May 1998, John Joseph, a Roman Catholic bishop and prominent human rights defender, [7c] shot himself dead in front of a tribunal at Sahiwal, near Faisalabad. The Bishop had committed suicide in protest against the blasphemy laws, especially section 295(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code, under which Ayub Masih [20] had been incarcerated in solitary confinement since 14 October 1996 and sentenced to death on 27 April 1998 [7c] for allegedly speaking favourably about Salman Rushdie. [20]

5.3.42 The incident sparked protests by Christians against section 295(c), as well as attacks by militant Muslims against an area known as Christian Town, during which they burned several houses and shops and demanded that section 295(c) remain on the statute books. [20]

5.3.43 Christian pressure groups and foreign governments have put pressure on the Government of Pakistan to amend the blasphemy laws. Nawaz Sharif expressed his regret at the bishop's suicide. In a condolence message to the bishop's family and the Christian community, he pledged that minority rights were guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan. He hoped that the bishop's suicide would not harm relations between the Christian minority and the Muslim majority. [6r]

5.3.44 No one has ever been executed in Pakistan for blasphemy, [6r] however, over a dozen Christians have been jailed under the blasphemy laws, four of whom were reportedly killed in detention. Ayub Masih is the fourth to be condemned to death; the other three were acquitted on appeal. [7c] Following an application from Ayub Masih's lawyers, the Lahore High Court on 12 May 1998 ordered suspension of the death sentence until the outcome of the appeal. [6s] The appeal was still pending at the end of 1998. [2]

See also Blasphemy Law: paragraphs 4.2.24 - 4.2.27; and Ahmadis: paragraphs 5.3.10 - 5.3.34.

5.3.45 According to the 1998 US State Department report reprisals against suspected converts to Christianity are common, and a general atmosphere of religious intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious minorities. Many Christians continue to express fear of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian women, although the practice is relatively rare. [2]

5.3.46 Christians have difficulty finding jobs other than those of menial labour, although Christian activists say that the employment situation has improved somewhat in the private sector. Christians find themselves disproportionately over represented in Pakistan's most oppressed social group: bonded labourers. Christians also claim that their children have difficulties in gaining admission to government schools and colleges, a problem they attribute to discrimination. [2]

5.3.47 Section 295(c) of the Penal Code, which stipulates the death penalty upon conviction of having blasphemed the Prophet Mohammed, has been used to bring blasphemy charges against Christians as well as Ahmadis. It is reported that during 1996 one First Information Report was registered against a Christian under section 295(c). [13] At least two Christians were charged with blasphemy in 1998, and remain in prison in Punjab. Another Christian was convicted of blasphemy on a lesser charge and released for time served (four-years). [2]

See also 1860 Pakistan Penal Code: paragraphs 4.2.19 - 4.2.31.

5.3.48 The Government attempted to introduce legal safeguards to protect individuals from false charges of blasphemy in the wake of the Salamat Masih case, but it backed down from introducing legislation in the face of pressure from Islamic parties. However, it appears that administrative changes have been made to the procedure for filing blasphemy charges so that there must be a judicial review of evidence before charges are laid, and if a blasphemy charge is found to be baseless, counter-charges will be laid against the complainant, who would face a penalty of up to ten years in prison. [12d]

See also Salamat Masih: paragraph 5.3.37.

5.3.49 A local Muslim cleric and a mob destroyed a Christian church in Sheikhupura, Punjab in December 1997. The cleric objected to the construction of the building on land sold by his brother-in-law to a Christian group. On the night of 26 January 1998, three armed intruders killed Noor Alam, the Presbyterian Church of Pakistan pastor who led the building of the church. Police made no arrests for either the killing or the property destruction. Another cleric was arrested near Faisalabad on 23 December 1998 for pulling down a crucifix and a microphone set up in a Roman Catholic church for Christmas. The vandal was quickly released. [2]

5.3.50 On 18 November 1998, nine members of a Christian family were killed and mutilated in their home in Nowshehra, in an attack that some Christians allege was sectarian. On 29 and 30 December 1998 four family members were arrested and charged with the crime. They asserted their innocence to the press, but the investigation of the incident was closed by the end of 1998. [2]

5.3.51 According to a February 1999 news report, Christians in Pakistan are turning to violent militant movements in a bid to counter increasing sectarian attacks and discrimination. One senior community leader said that Catholic church elders were deeply worried by the trend towards violence. Community leaders fear this may lead to a civil war with Muslims. [19b] Several Pakistani Christians claim to have infiltrated hard line Islamic movements and to have spent months in training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan learning guerrilla tactics. Others have joined the "Christian Taliban". The movement's aims are unclear but appear to be a mixture of self-defence and, in a clear copy of the original Taliban, the enforcement of a harsh moral code. Others have called for the formation of armed defence organizations modelled on extremist Muslim groups. The Bishop of Lahore, Alexander Malik, has reportedly called for volunteers for a new organization called the Sipah-e-Masiyah ('Defenders of the Messiah'). Sources among church leaders in Lahore reported in February 1999 that the Sipah-e-Masiyah was "ready and waiting". [19b]

5.3.52 Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported in April 1999 that in Gujaranwala, three more Christians had been accused of blasphemy as a way of getting even and settling a grudge. CSW also reported that there had been reports of police intimidation against the tiny Christian community in the area, resulting in some families moving out. [27b]

5.3.53 While the majority of the Muslim population belong to the Sunni sect, some 20 - 25% is Shia. [2] Shias are well integrated into Pakistani society but there have been outbreaks of violence between the two sects. Sunni-Shia differences are grounded in theological disputes which date back for centuries. Often violence erupts over perceived slights individual Shias and Sunnis believe they have experienced from members of the othe